Functional Area	Assessment Level	Best Practice	Section	Feasibility
Risk Assessment	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues conduct a risk assessment.	Intro	
Risk Assessment	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues collect information including but not limited to the venue's profile, threat evaluations and a catalogue of current safety measures and policies.	Intro	
Risk Assessment	**Strongly Recommended**	Static risk assessments be supplemented by establishing a Dynamic On-going Risk Assessment (DORA) process to enhance risk management capabilities.	Intro	
Risk Assessment	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues understand and be able to describe the risk assessment tool(s) and process used, including the methodology for assigning risk, to ensure the assessment is carried out properly.	Intro	
Risk Assessment	**Strongly Recommended**	The venues identify internal stakeholders involved in day-to-day operations and security who can be part of the [risk assessment] process.	2.1	
Risk Assessment	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues specify [as part of the venue profile] the ownership of not only the venue but also the owners of the property on which the venue is located and, if necessary, the owner(s) of the organization/team primarily utilizing the venue.	2.2	
Risk Assessment	**Strongly Recommended**	venues develop a complete profile to include detailed lists and site locations of critical assets.	2.2	
Risk Assessment	**Strongly Recommended**	The venue profile includes some high level general facility information such as the facility name, owner/operator, address, GPS coordinates, size and capacity, and the basic facility operational purpose.	2.2	
Risk Assessment	**Strongly Recommended**	A description of the typical events that take place at the venue, their frequency and how the venue is used during those events be included in the venue profile.	2.2	
Risk Assessment	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues conduct an analysis, in coordination with the surrounding roadway management agencies, to understand the flow of vehicles and pedestrians as well as general traffic demand.	2.2	
Risk Assessment	**Strongly Recommended**	The traffic/transportation analysis includes the development of specific traffic flow egress maps for the venues that include specific egress routes for responding emergency vehicles and/or first responders.	2.2	
Risk Assessment	**Strongly Recommended**	The venue profile expands to describe the various [physical and personnel] critical assets.	2.2	
Risk Assessment	**Strongly Recommended**	The risk assessment includes a thorough threat assessment and be as inclusive as possible in its threat consideration.	2.3.1	

Functional Area	Assessment Level	Best Practice	Section	Feasibility
Risk Assessment	**Strongly Recommended**	Venue operators determines the relative likelihood of each threat occurring at the venue.	2.3.1	
Risk Assessment	**Strongly Recommended**	The risk assessment includes standard staffing plans and training for event and non-event days detailing the number of staff available, and their assigned positions.	2.3.2	
Risk Assessment	**Strongly Recommended**	A risk assessment contain a detailed fire safety risk assessment and a medical response risk assessment.	2.3.2	
Risk Assessment	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues measure the security system's ability to detect a threat prior to an occurrence.	2.3.2	
Risk Assessment	**Strongly Recommended**	Consequences be considered (see Table 2 for some types of consequences).	2.3.2	
Risk Assessment	**Strongly Recommended**	The risk assessment team thoroughly identify the available security control measures available to them on a regular basis and deployed based upon the results of the threat prioritization.	2.3.3	
Risk Assessment	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues identify potential interdependencies with surrounding infrastructures.	2.4	
Risk Assessment	**Strongly Recommended**	Continuous evaluation of the base-line risk assessment be carried out based on the quality assurance program implemented by the venue.	2.5.1	
Risk Assessment	**Strongly Recommended**	On-going re-assessment of the base-line risk assessment be done annually at a minimum.	2.5.1	
Risk Assessment	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues incorporate a Dynamic On-going Risk Assessment (DORA) process to address intelligence being received continuously, lessons learned from	2.5.2	

Functional Area	Assessment Level	Best Practice	Section	Feasibility
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Strongly Recommended**	A venue's incident response plan involves coordination and communication with public safety and public health officials, as well as the local JTTF (Joint Terrorism Task Force) and fusion centers where possible.	**3.1**	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Strongly Recommended**	Decisions on the roles and authority of involved agencies and individuals be made during security planning sessions and not during an incident.	3.1	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues follow a model [for managing incidents] similar to the Incident Command Structure unified command model.	3.1	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Strongly Recommended**	Communication with outside groups remain open even during normal operating procedures.	3.1	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Strongly Recommended**	A venue identifies a centralized location as an operations center.	3.1	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Strongly Recommended**	The venue's command center be staffed by members of supporting and stakeholder agencies to efficiently communicate with security team members.	3.1	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues develop job descriptions for every employee.	3.2	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Strongly Recommended**	As part of the job descriptions, venues clarify who takes over certain roles if the individual originally in that position is not present or is incapacitated.	3.2	

Functional Area	Assessment Level	Best Practice	Section	Feasibility
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Strongly Recommended**	A venue maintains a detailed staffing organization chart.	3.2	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Strongly Recommended**	In-house security directors provide and communicate an organizational structure with contract labor management so response time efficiency is not eroded due to hierarchical confusion.	3.2	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Strongly Recommended**	A venue considers ways that the resiliency of the chain of command can be strengthened.	3.2	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues assess its ability to predict fan attendance accurately, and its ability to quickly add staff to respond to changes in the risk profile of an event.	3.3	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Strongly Recommended**	A venue considers ways of increasing the flexibility of the front-line workforce [to respond to severe weather, low staff turnout, etc.].	3.3	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues assess the importance of various security functions and analyze the ability of staff to perform the functions considered critical even under adverse conditions.	3.3	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues monitor security employment levels in order to identify issues before a lack of employees begins to affect other metrics of performance.	3.4.1	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Strongly Recommended**	A venue tracks employee turnover rates, and address the issue if rates become so high that they adversely affect the ability of the venue to fully implement the security plan.	3.4.1	

Functional Area	Assessment Level	Best Practice	Section	Feasibility
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Strongly Recommended**	A venue's human resources department institutes language into the employment contract for annual or bi-annual performance interviews with top security managers or directors.	3.4.1	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Strongly Recommended**	Security clearly define which employees have the authority to grant credentials to employees, media and other groups, and that the credentialing process be written down and reviewed by security.	3.4.1	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Strongly Recommended**	A database of credentials granted be maintained.	3.4.1	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Strongly Recommended**	A venue considers how to limit the threat of an insider attack.	3.4.2	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Strongly Recommended**	A venue limits the access of employees to only what is determined necessary for their specific job.	**3.4.2**	

Functional Area	Assessment Level	Best Practice	Section	Feasibility
Information Management	**Strongly Recommended**	An internal communications structure and protocol be established as part of a sports venue security plan regardless of size or event type.	4.1.1.1	
Information Management	**Strongly Recommended**	Radio communications be monitored at the command center.	4.1.1.1	
Information Management	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues use a computer database to record features of incidents or communications that can then be used for later analysis.	4.1.1.2	
Information Management	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues arrange a direct line of contact to local law enforcement within the command center.	4.1.2.1	
Information Management	**Strongly Recommended**	The Security Director of the venue subscribes to a notification list in order to receive incident and threat notifications from the local fusion center, the Joint Terrorist Task Force (JTTF) or other federal alert systems.	4.1.2.1	
Information Management	**Strongly Recommended**	A direct line of contact be established with the local fire department as well as with the local medical center or hospital through telephone lines, personal contacts, emergency radios or several of the above.	4.1.2.2	
Information Management	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues have emergency medical personnel on staff during an event.	4.1.2.2	
Information Management	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues consider reserving one or more rooms as a medical center.	4.1.2.2	
Information Management	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues establish a channel of communication with nearby critical infrastructure sites.	4.1.2.3	
Information Management	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues establish contact with the local utility companies providing utility services to the venues.	4.1.2.3	
Information Management	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues have the use of an audio public address system in order to communicate with the patrons at the facility during a public event.	4.1.3.1	
Information Management	**Strongly Recommended**	Emergency messages include specific evacuation instructions, shelter in place instructions, incident notification and incident status updates (for example in the case of a blackout), and any other necessary information.	4.1.3.1	
Information Management	**Strongly Recommended**	Public address messages be prepared in advance of an emergency and ready for use.	4.1.3.1	
Information Management	**Strongly Recommended**	Each specific message be recorded in advance so that it may be played remotely if the public address announcer has to evacuate.	4.1.3.1	
Information Management	**Strongly Recommended**	The public address system be connected to the emergency generator, or some other power source so that it can continue to operate if electrical service is interrupted.	4.1.3.1	

Functional Area	Assessment Level	Best Practice	Section	Feasibility
Information Management	**Strongly Recommended**	During an evacuation or other emergencies, the electronic message boards may be used to display evacuation instructions and guidance.	4.1.3.2	
Information Management	**Strongly Recommended**	Basic messages addressing a variety of potential emergency situations be prepared in advance so that they may be activated in case the area where messages are controlled has to be evacuated.	4.1.3.2	
Information Management	**Strongly Recommended**	If television monitors are in use, the visual quality and the size of the monitors be sufficient and that they are effectively and strategically placed at appropriate locations.	4.1.3.3	
Information Management	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues employ the use of temporary or permanent signage to assist in crowd management in and around the venue.	4.1.3.4	
Information Management	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues protect and monitor computer systems and network infrastructure to be prepared against cyber-attacks.	**4.2.1**	
Information Management	**Strongly Recommended**	Computer systems be tested regularly and security reassessments be performed to help identify any potential vulnerabilities as well as assist in detecting any patterns of probing, hacking, or intrusions.	4.2.1	

Functional Area	Assessment Level	Best Practice	Section	Feasibility
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Specific "zones" or concentric rings be established, for which there is a reasonable expectation that a certain level of security can be maintained within the zone.	Intro	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Training and exercises focus on [response operations] as part of the venue's training plan.	Intro	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Security tactics be implemented prior to, during, and after people access [parking] lots or structures.	5.1.1	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Security tactics include assigning staff to [parking] areas who are able to relay information to the command center.	5.1.1	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Vehicles parking within 100 feet of the venue structure be checked utilizing a detailed vehicle security screening process.	5.1.1	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Any public transportation systems that intersect the outer perimeter be addressed by venues in their security plans.	5.1.2	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues develop and implement a vendor and service provider security protocol to ensure only those cleared to pass through the outer perimeter can do so.	5.1.3	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues employ at least one of the following methods of patron screening: pat-down, wanding, magnetometer.	5.2.1	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues employ training and random tests of patron screening staff to mitigate [inconsistent or poor performance].	5.2.1	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues limit the possibility of magnetometers acting as an obstruction during an evacuation.	5.2.1	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues also screen bags upon entering stadiums.	5.2.1	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues estimate queue length at patron screening lines in order to assess the risk to patrons waiting in line to enter the stadium.	5.2.1	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	All vehicles requesting access to a loading dock at the venue undergo thorough screening.	5.2.2	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Deliveries be allowed only if scheduled in advance.	5.2.2	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	The contents listed on the submitted and vetted manifest be reconciled with the contents of the vehicle or truck at the time of delivery.	5.2.2	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	The previously submitted and vetted driver's license of the delivery person match that of the person making the delivery.	5.2.2	

Functional Area	Assessment Level	Best Practice	Section	Feasibility
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	All broadcast camera transfer cases either be removed to the broadcast truck, or secured and locked.	5.2.3	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	All media trucks and vehicles that are permitted to enter the premises of the venue be thoroughly inspected.	5.2.3	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Cameras be placed along the outside perimeter of the venue and at key vantage points within the [middle] zone that grant a view of the crowd, including queues and entrances.	5.2.4	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Each sports venue incorporates into its security plan operational protocols for the purposes of sweeping by trained security staff.	5.2.5	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Regularly scheduled sweeps build upon incentive-based training scenarios so as to leverage continuity between exercise and practice.	5.2.5	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Pre-event sweeps include protocols to ensure that rooms, the merchandise and concession warehouse, and other venue spaces are properly swept as part of the pre-event process and/or response to a bomb threat.	5.2.5	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues have cameras installed that provide coverage for all major and minor areas within the venue – including blind corners, and that venues have the ability to store copious amounts of digital videotape footage captured by the cameras.	5.3.1	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	All sports venues perform manned sweeps before every event to look for suspicious items including signs of equipment tampering.	5.3.2	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Sweeps [of the inner security zone] incorporate a random check of food vendor product as it is unloaded from the vendor truck to the product storage within concession areas.	5.3.2	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	All sports venues draft a plan that clearly defines areas and access points for all personnel within the hierarchy.	5.3.3	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues draft proper signage indicating to patrons which areas within the inner zone they can access and which they cannot.	5.3.3	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues use credentialing to assist in limiting employee and patron access to appropriate areas.	5.3.3	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Color coding on credentials be used to delineate clearly the access levels of an employee, and that a photo also be present on the ID to ensure its use by the rightful owner only.	5.3.3	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues implement mail-handling security policies based upon guidance by the United States Postal Service.	5.3.4	

Functional Area	Assessment Level	Best Practice	Section	Feasibility
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Every venue has an incident response plan, at minimum formalizing in writing the existing unwritten plans.	5.4.1	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Incident response plan policies and procedures be drilled regularly.	5.4.1	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Government agency best practices be incorporated into [the venue's] incident response plans as appropriate.	5.4.1	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Evacuation and shelter-in-place plans be a core component of the security incident plans developed to support response capabilities.	5.4.1	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	A plan for handling the possibility of mass fatalities be developed.	5.4.1	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues develop procedures and metrics for quickly determining whether an evacuation is necessary.	5.4.2	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues maintain statistics on end of event clearance time, in order to estimate how quickly an evacuation might be possible.	**5.4.2**	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues prioritize development of specific incident plans based on their potential threat as identified in the risk assessment.	5.4.3	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues develop comprehensive evacuation plans.	5.4.3	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues use tabletop exercises as a way to test and develop incident management plans.	5.4.3	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues participate in tabletop exercises with quantifiable metrics of performance.	5.4.3	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Tabletop exercises be as realistic as possible.	5.4.3	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	The security management of a venue includes venue management in incident response planning.	5.4.3	

Functional Area	Assessment Level	Best Practice	Section	Feasibility
Training & Evaluation	**Strongly Recommended**	Security managers at sports venues knows or be able to access their state's guard certification requirements, especially when hiring contracted security vendors.	6.1.1	
Training & Evaluation	**Strongly Recommended**	The venue security director establishes a set of minimum competency standards for security practices.	6.1.2	
Training & Evaluation	**Strongly Recommended**	Minimum competency standards be applicable to all employees at a venue.	6.1.2	
Training & Evaluation	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues establish an introductory tour and assessment for contract guards so as to increase contract guards' familiarity with the venue and its unique features as part of a comprehensive training program.	6.1.2	
Training & Evaluation	**Strongly Recommended**	Training be thought of as a constant activity that helps keep venue staff alert, informed, and engaged through the acquisition of new information.	6.1.3	
Training & Evaluation	**Strongly Recommended**	All venue staff, including security staff, both contracted and in–house, guest services staff, maintenance staff, custodial personnel, parking staff, and food vendors receive some level of training designed by the venue security director.	6.1.3	
Training & Evaluation	**Strongly Recommended**	Training include both an educational component and a testing component.	6.1.3	
Training & Evaluation	**Strongly Recommended**	The results of training examinations be recorded and maintained as part of employee files.	6.1.3	
Training & Evaluation	**Strongly Recommended**	Refresher training sessions be held regularly.	6.1.3	
Training & Evaluation	**Strongly Recommended**	Pre-season training occur and at minimum include customer service training but ideally also include higher level incident response training for all levels of employees.	6.1.4	
Training & Evaluation	**Strongly Recommended**	After Action Reports (AARs) be used properly, i.e. noting deficiencies and then following up with action (accountability) to improve deficiencies prior to the next exercise or event.	6.1.4	
Training & Evaluation	**Strongly Recommended**	The AAR and discovered areas of weaknesses or areas for improvement be used to drive the objectives for the next training exercise.	6.1.4	
Training & Evaluation	**Strongly Recommended**	Patrons of a venue be educated on emergency procedures prior to the start of each event.	6.1.5	
Training & Evaluation	**Strongly Recommended**	Every sport venue security plan incorporates some form of basic red teaming to assess their front-line personnel.	6.2.1	

Functional Area	Assessment Level	Best Practice	Section	Feasibility
Training & Evaluation	**Strongly Recommended**	A venue has a clearly drawn and readily accessible organizational chart to clarify responsibility for auditing performance.	6.2.2	
Training & Evaluation	**Strongly Recommended**	All aspects of the performance of security management (organization skill, supervisory capabilities, and leadership) be audited and rewarded appropriately by whomever the manager reports to in the organization.	6.2.2	

Functional Area	Assessment Level	Best Practice	Section	Feasibility
Risk Assessment	**Recommended**	The scale of the risk assessment carried out (the number and kinds of internal and external stakeholders involved, the number of consultants employed (if any), the deployment of security technologies, etc.) be appropriately sized for the venue and its associated risk.	**Intro**	
Risk Assessment	**Recommended**	League officials become familiar with assessments of risk that pertain to all league venues and also those risks specific to unique venues or venue attributes.	Intro	
Risk Assessment	**Recommended**	External stakeholders for the risk assessment process include local law enforcement, emergency medical services providers, fire services providers (including the fire marshal) and other first responders who may respond to an incident at the facility.	2.1	
Risk Assessment	**Recommended**	The traffic/transportation analysis includes the identification of hot spots or critical intersections where traffic and crowds build.	2.2	
Risk Assessment	**Recommended**	The critical assets be described so that their importance to operations is highlighted, so that this information can feed into the risk assessment.	2.2	
Risk Assessment	**Recommended**	A detailed site-layout plan also be developed depicting all structures on the premises, and the locations of emergency response equipment specifically identifying on venue maps the locations of fire extinguishers, fire hoses, pull stations and related fire/life safety equipment along with the location of automated external defibrillator (AED) units throughout the venue.	2.2	
Risk Assessment	**Recommended**	Venues consider conducting research into incidents which have occurred nationally or internationally through established terrorism databases, potential incidents that have occurred at the venue operator's facility or an in-kind facility, or may have been deterred or stopped by current security measures.	2.3.1	
Risk Assessment	**Recommended**	The ability for response systems to surge during mass fatality incidents and other major threats be identified.	2.3.2	
Risk Assessment	**Recommended**	The vulnerability assessment includes inherent facility design flaws that a terrorist may exploit to increase the consequences of an attack.	2.3.2	
Risk Assessment	**Recommended**	Venues consider attacks from various originating access points such as vehicles, persons, air-borne attacks, and water-based attacks.	2.3.2	
Risk Assessment	**Recommended**	Venues consider their ability to respond and recover from an incident as part of their vulnerability assessments.	2.3.2	
Risk Assessment	**Recommended**	Venues consider how a threat may cause economic impacts [in addition to human casualties].	2.3.2	
Risk Assessment	**Recommended**	Other consequences such as cascading effects on interdependent infrastructures and resources be considered.	2.3.2	

Functional Area	Assessment Level	Best Practice	Section	Feasibility
Risk Assessment	**Recommended**	Venues expand the risk assessment further to detail how an expected and anticipated variation to each event impacts the prioritization and risks posed to the venue.	2.3.3	
Risk Assessment	**Recommended**	Utility providers also be reviewed. [How to address loss of electricity, gas, or water should a utility be attacked or fail?] What sort of impact might an attack or failure within the venue have on the utility provider?	2.4	
Risk Assessment	**Recommended**	A review of infrastructure interdependencies include support service facilities such as food and drink vendors, local hotels and motels and parking structure owner/operators.	2.4	
Risk Assessment	**Recommended**	All facilities that pose a risk to the venue if an incident occurs at that facility be included in the analysis of infrastructure interdependencies.	2.4	
Risk Assessment	**Recommended**	Venues share the results with law enforcement agencies with direct jurisdictional responsibilities and, if deemed appropriate, escalate the results to higher levels of government and law enforcement.	2.5.1	

Functional Area	Assessment Level	Best Practice	Section	Feasibility
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Recommended**	A venue consider how insulated their on-site security center is.	3.1	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Recommended**	The venues try to keep the public from accessing the location of the command center and other areas crucial to the implementation of the security plan and the response to any security incidents.	3.1	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Recommended**	A secondary, remote command center be set up, if an event is especially large or identified as particularly at risk for a terrorist attack.	3.1	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Recommended**	Venues consider how frequently they reiterate and review unified command structure and planning, and how often they run joint tabletop exercises.	3.1	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Recommended**	A structure be in place to identify and brief newly appointed individuals on their role in incident command operations whenever turnover internally or in outside agencies does take place.	3.1	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Recommended**	Venues design contingency plans in case lines of communication are not available during an emergency.	3.1	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Recommended**	A test of the strength of the unified command system, be it through a tabletop exercise or some other method, include measuring both the speed with which decisions are made as well as the validity of the decisions.	3.1	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Recommended**	Smaller venues and smaller leagues seek out a larger, more established venue to observe their security procedures and develop a point of contact to consult with on security issues.	3.1	

Functional Area	Assessment Level	Best Practice	Section	Feasibility
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Recommended**	Employees be given index cards or some other job aid to help remind them what their responsibilities are during an event and what is expected of them during an emergency situation.	3.2	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Recommended**	Entries in the credentials granted database be randomly audited to ensure that credentials are being properly distributed.	3.4.1	

Functional Area	Assessment Level	Best Practice	Section	Feasibility
Information Management	**Recommended**	A system of channel assignment be employed, so as not to crowd any single channel with excessive traffic.	**4.1.1.1**	
Information Management	**Recommended**	Radios be checked before being needed for events.	4.1.1.1	
Information Management	**Recommended**	First responders, including law enforcement, test the capabilities of their radio systems within all areas of the venue at least annually to ensure their operability.	4.1.1.1	
Information Management	**Recommended**			
Information Management	**Recommended**	Protocols be instituted for incident reporting following any type of disturbance at the venue, such as public intoxication, physical altercation, underage alcohol consumption, drug use, and illegal ticket sales.	4.1.1.2	
Information Management	**Recommended**	Written communication, either paper or electronic, be used as a channel from staff to management regarding areas that require improvement or signal a need for attention.	4.1.1.2	
Information Management	**Recommended**	If an emergency telephone reporting system is in place that it be coupled with a system of identification that indicates the precise location of the phone from which the call is placed.	4.1.1.4	
Information Management	**Recommended**	A wired telephone independent of the facility's system be installed in the command center in case the system is compromised.	4.1.1.4	
Information Management	**Recommended**	Venues include a law enforcement presence in the command center from federal authorities as well as local law enforcement.	4.1.2.1	
Information Management	**Recommended**	Venues employ a paid law enforcement detail during event day operations.	4.1.2.1	
Information Management	**Recommended**	An EMS representative as well as a representative from the local fire department be stationed inside the command center during events.	4.1.2.2	
Information Management	**Recommended**	Venue representatives establish a point of contact at a critical infrastructure site with a person holding the authority to make necessary operational decisions during an emergency.	4.1.2.3	
Information Management	**Recommended**	Venues periodically verify the point of contact at infrastructure sites and update the contact information if necessary.	4.1.2.3	
Information Management	**Recommended**	The Director of Security or the Director's designee takes responsibility for composing the content of the message during an emergency when pre-recorded messages cannot be used.	4.1.3.1	
Information Management	**Recommended**	If electronic message boards are in use, the system be utilized during non-emergency situations to regularly test its functionality.	4.1.3.2	

Functional Area	Assessment Level	Best Practice	Section	Feasibility
Information Management	**Recommended**	If television monitors are in use, the system be utilized during non-emergency situations to regularly test its functionality.	4.1.3.3	
Information Management	**Recommended**	Permanent signage provides emergency contact information, incident or suspicious item reporting telephone numbers, evacuation routes and exits, and the location of emergency equipment.	4.1.3.4	
Information Management	**Recommended**	Posted signage be used at the entrances for queuing and patron screening procedures, e.g. to identify objects that are restricted or prohibited from the venue.	4.1.3.4	
Information Management	**Recommended**	Venues consider establishing a text messaging system that provides patrons with a number to which they can text a complaint or report of a disturbance.	4.1.3.5	
Information Management	**Recommended**	If guest text messaging is in use at the venue, a database of reported incidents be maintained for analysis.	4.1.3.5	
Information Management	**Recommended**	Venues consider having an online presence through social platforms such as Twitter, Facebook or Instagram.	4.1.3.6	
Information Management	**Recommended**	If venues use social media, they engage patrons in discussions prior to events, answer questions and concerns, as well as provide relevant event day information and updates.	4.1.3.6	
Information Management	**Recommended**	Protocols be developed for ingesting, evaluating, and acting upon reports of various kinds (e.g. "See something, say something").	4.1.3.6	
Information Management	**Recommended**	Venues build a plan to mitigate cyber-security risks.	4.2.1	
Information Management	**Recommended**	Cyber-security technologies be used to ensure that system processes are functioning properly, data is not compromised, and information can be accessed when needed.	**4.2.1**	

Functional Area	Assessment Level	Best Practice	Section	Feasibility
Operations	**Recommended**	Some assigned staff [in parking areas] include patrols of trained security or law enforcement personnel.	5.1.1	
Operations	**Recommended**	Patrols [in parking lots] be on foot and visit locations in random order.	5.1.1	
Operations	**Recommended**	All [parking] lots be surrounded by physical infrastructure such as fences, trees or walls, and that a network of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras be used to support monitoring and response.	5.1.1	
Operations	**Recommended**	Vehicles be kept at least 100 feet away from the facility whenever possible.	5.1.1	
Operations	**Recommended**	Venues use clear garbage cans with clear liners and have security personnel check them regularly during an event.	5.1.1	
Operations	**Recommended**	All vendors provide a list of personnel and their vehicles, plate numbers, and other information for verification.	5.1.3	
Operations	**Recommended**	Access for mail, deliveries, and non-essential repairs be cut off well in advance of the event start time.	5.1.3	
Operations	**Recommended**	Some method is employed to lessen the risk that a bag could be used as a container to deliver an IED.	5.2.1	
Operations	**Recommended**	Simulation and modeling be used to understand and project variations in screening, and in patron behavior.	5.2.1	
Operations	**Recommended**	Venues attempt to modify fan behavior to reduce queue lines and track the success of various [incentive] programs.	5.2.1	
Operations	**Recommended**	Venues set and meet queue size goals.	5.2.1	
Operations	**Recommended**	Vehicle screening include a survey of the vehicle undercarriage as well as of the vehicle contents including the trunk of any vehicle and both the inside and cab of the truck or trailer.	5.2.2	
Operations	**Recommended**	Delivery vehicles be screened for explosives using the K-9 unit if one is available.	5.2.2	
Operations	**Recommended**	Delivery vehicles be swiped for the detection of explosive materials if no K-9 unit is available.	5.2.2	
Operations	**Recommended**	The screening of media trucks include a survey of the vehicle's contents.	5.2.3	
Operations	**Recommended**	Cameras [placed in the middle security zone] be monitored at the command center.	5.2.4	
Operations	**Recommended**	All personnel monitoring the cameras be trained in how to detect suspicious activity and behavior.	5.2.4	
Operations	**Recommended**	Cameras be trained on key air intake and electrical delivery systems so as to help harden security against the introduction of a chemical or biological agents into the system or disrupting venue power.	5.2.4	

Functional Area	Assessment Level	Best Practice	Section	Feasibility
Operations	**Recommended**	The plan [defining areas and access points for all personnel within the hierarchy] corresponds to key-card level access, if such a system is in place.	5.3.3	
Operations	**Recommended**	Certain venues with unique footprints and appropriate budgets incorporate alarm systems that trigger when unauthorized entry is made through access points within the inner zone.	5.3.3	
Operations	**Recommended**	Smart card technology be used, since this technology can assist in tracking employee movements and monitoring for suspicious behavior.	5.3.3	
Operations	**Recommended**	Venue security reviews the protocol concerning who gets what kind of credentials and how those are verified.	5.3.3	
Operations	**Recommended**	Venues establish food security policies which address the entire supply chain beyond just the inner security zone.	5.3.4	
Operations	**Recommended**	Venues try to minimize the number of decisions that are not predetermined.	5.4.2	
Operations	**Recommended**	Testing of [evacuation] procedures be done via tabletop exercises, and also that plans be developed in consultation with public partners.	5.4.2	
Operations	**Recommended**	Venues use the tools at their disposal to prepare fans for potential evacuation before the start of an event.	5.4.2	
Operations	**Recommended**	Venues place staff in positions to assist patrons needing to move throughout the venue.	5.4.2	
Operations	**Recommended**	If these staff [those assisting patrons needing to move] are not security personnel they still receive briefings and training on procedures for an evacuation.	5.4.2	
Operations	**Recommended**	Venues monitor major egress routes for anomalies throughout an event.	5.4.2	
Operations	**Recommended**	Venues coordinate with local authorities, especially transit agencies, to be sure that crowds can disperse quickly in both evacuation and normal end of event scenarios.	5.4.2	
Operations	**Recommended**	Venues monitor and sweep outside areas where large numbers of fans are likely to congregate or pass through after an event.	5.4.2	
Operations	**Recommended**	Venues develop a set of general response principles that can then be applied to whatever incidents do develop, in combination with specific response plans.	5.4.3	
Operations	**Recommended**	Venue managers be prepared for what to say and do publicly in an emergency.	5.4.3	
Operations	**Recommended**	Security at a venue advise venue management, which is usually civilian, how to interact with outside agencies in the event that these agencies must come in and take over command of venue security.	5.4.3	

Functional Area	Assessment Level	Best Practice	Section	Feasibility
Training & Evaluation	**Recommended**	Various levels of higher proficiency [beyond minimum competency] in security procedures be instituted.	6.1.2	
Training & Evaluation	**Recommended**	The positions be clearly defined as to which positions this tiered set of [minimum to higher-level] practices applies.	6.1.2	
Training & Evaluation	**Recommended**	Security managers consider implementing short (5-minute) refresher training modules for both in-house and contract security on a daily or weekly basis.	6.1.2	
Training & Evaluation	**Recommended**	Once every six months is an appropriate timetable for training refresher courses.	6.1.3	
Training & Evaluation	**Recommended**	Venue operators consider: Many resources are available to the local security director through federal agencies.	6.1.3	
Training & Evaluation	**Recommended**	Venue operators consider: Mutual aid agreements between the venue operator or security director and local law enforcement that can include tabletop exercises to provide benefits for both parties.	6.1.3	
Training & Evaluation	**Recommended**	Venue operators consider: Coordinated training efforts help to not only establish strong positive ties between the venue and local fire and law enforcement services, but also the relationship can speed up effective coordinated incident management during actual incidents.	6.1.3	
Training & Evaluation	**Recommended**	A challenge program be used – if an employee sees someone carrying out a procedure incorrectly and reports it, the employee is rewarded. In addition, when an employee notices that another employee has correctly followed procedure, they can also be rewarded for their knowledge and awareness.	6.1.3	
Training & Evaluation	**Recommended**	Some exercises endeavor to involve as many players, entities, partners, and stakeholders as possible.	6.1.4	
Training & Evaluation	**Recommended**	Training be an ongoing process that can be budgeted on an annual basis.	6.1.4	
Training & Evaluation	**Recommended**			
Training & Evaluation	**Recommended**	Short, 5-minute, topic training sessions be given 15 minutes prior to an event (just-in-time training) to keep information fresh, in addition to the semi-annual refresher training.	6.1.4	
Training & Evaluation	**Recommended**			
Training & Evaluation	**Recommended**	[Patron] training be in the form of a brief informational video and/or a printed pamphlet describing evacuation routes and instructions for sheltering in place.	6.1.5	

Functional Area	Assessment Level	Best Practice	Section	Feasibility
Training & Evaluation	**Recommended**	Venues using wands develop testing protocols for wands and their users including basic strategies for read-teaming.	6.2.1	

Functional Area	Assessment Level	Best Practice	Section	Feasibility
Risk Assessment	**Suggested**	Venues provide additional details about the venue's ownership structure, legal requirements and standards, and security funding mechanism(s) in those instances where not-for-profit (NFP) agencies own part or all of the venue, the property, or the team or organization primarily using the venue.	**2.2**	
Risk Assessment	**Suggested**	Venues also consider criticality, accessibility, the ability to recover from threats, and the ability to recognize threats.	2.3.2	
Risk Assessment	**Suggested**	Visible vulnerability be addressed. Should a terrorist be able to gather intelligence through reconnaissance and identify the location of critical systems, those systems become more vulnerable.	2.3.2	
Risk Assessment	**Suggested**	Consequence identification includes the length of time it will take for the venue to begin operating again and the time it will take to recover fully.	2.3.2	
Risk Assessment	**Suggested**	Environmental impacts [consequences] to be addressed.	2.3.2	
Risk Assessment	**Suggested**	Risk assessments be updated more frequently than once per year, and may include pre-, mid-, and/or postseason reviews.	2.5.1	
Risk Assessment	**Suggested**	Venues consider developing a cost benefit analysis procedure that allows decision makers to effectively manage risk.	**2.5.2**	

Functional Area	Assessment Level	Best Practice	Section	Feasibility
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Suggested**	Venues contact nearby locations to determine if any [collaborative] partnerships could be mutually beneficial.	3.1	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Suggested**	Venues train staff for multiple roles in order to increase the flexibility of the workforce.	3.3	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Suggested**	The updating of background checks be done at random as well as whenever there are indicators of a re-check (e.g. employees who show up driving expensive vehicles clearly outside their apparent economic means).	**3.4.2**	

Functional Area	Assessment Level	Best Practice	Section	Feasibility
Information Management	**Suggested**	Venue operators consider the use of multi-channel radios for internal communication for ALL staff.	4.1.1.1	
Information Management	**Suggested**	Coded messages be used so as not to instill panic in patrons.	4.1.1.1	
Information Management	**Suggested**	Venues consider whether electronic or paper-based communication should be utilized to apprise security staff of known threats prior to an event.	4.1.1.2	
Information Management	**Suggested**	Venues consider the use of an emergency paging system.	4.1.1.3	
Information Management	**Suggested**	Venues investigate available technical solutions if cellular call volume causes network overload.	4.1.1.4	
Information Management	**Suggested**	Venues verify contact information at nearby infrastructure sites at least semi-annually.	4.1.2.3	
Information Management	**Suggested**	Pictorial depictions be used on signs to help patrons, including those with limited proficiency in English, understand and remember what items are permissible in the venue.	**4.1.3.4**	
Information Management	**Suggested**	If a text messaging system is in use, this system be considered for the dissemination of information to patrons during an emergency.	4.1.3.5	

Functional Area	Assessment Level	Best Practice	Section	Feasibility
Operations	**Suggested**	Some of [the staff assigned to parking lots] be in plain clothes to allow for their integration into parking lot activities without drawing the attention of suspicious persons and that some of them be trained in behavioral assessment.	5.1.1	
Operations	**Suggested**	Vehicles parking [more than 100 feet] away from the structure [also] be checked utilizing a detailed vehicle security screening process [in addition to vehicles within 100 feet].	5.1.1	
Operations	**Suggested**	Venues consider integrating license plate reader devices at parking access points to identify potential threats.	5.1.1	
Operations	**Suggested**	Venues with larger budgets devoted to security development consider the following pilot program on a small scale: Set up target vehicle parking areas in which vehicles in high risk of drawing criminal activity or identified by intelligence reports may be located in sight of parking lot staff. Alternatively, staff may be assigned to monitor vehicles if parking in these target areas is not possible.	5.1.1	
Operations	**Suggested**	Visiting teams be inspected off-site [for sports events].	5.1.3	
Operations	**Suggested**	Venues located near airports and venues having established flight takeoff or approach paths over them coordinate with airport officials and the Federal Aviation Administration to see if alternative paths are available during event-day operations.	5.1.4	
Operations	**Suggested**	A venue consider using a combination of methods in patron screening in order to take advantage of the value of the most effective screening techniques, and the speed of alternative techniques.	5.2.1	
Operations	**Suggested**	Venues consider rotating staff in and out of the busiest and most stressful patron screening jobs.	5.2.1	
Operations	**Suggested**	Guidelines to limit the size of bags be established, taking into account the needs of patrons along with the venue risk assessment.	5.2.1	
Operations	**Suggested**	Venues provide incentives for those coming without bags, for instance moving those patrons to faster-moving inspection lanes.	5.2.1	
Operations	**Suggested**	Venues consider employing more patron screeners and/or training screeners more thoroughly to maximize their effectiveness and speed.	5.2.1	
Operations	**Suggested**	Venues consider developing incentives [for patrons] to arrive earlier and/or arrive at less busy gates.	5.2.1	
Operations	**Suggested**	Venues consider employing a patron screening strategy that is responsive to queue size; for example switching procedures or randomizing procedures if the size gets too large.	5.2.1	
Operations	**Suggested**	Venues consider cutting off access to a gate if the queue size at the gate gets too large.	5.2.1	
Operations	**Suggested**	Venues study and potentially pilot a program for expedited screening of season ticket holders and other trusted patrons, possibly patterned after the TSA PreCheck program.	5.2.1	

Functional Area	Assessment Level	Best Practice	Section	Feasibility
Operations	**Suggested**	Media personnel be screened separately in order to allow a careful and attentive screening of equipment and credentials.	5.2.3	
Operations	**Suggested**	Venues may wish to consider a separate entrance for media personnel access.	5.2.3	
Operations	**Suggested**	A combination of devoted camera and positioned security personnel at key intakes or electrical stations be deployed.	5.2.4	
Operations	**Suggested**	The venues consider moving cameras from time to time, perhaps using randomized placement.	5.2.4	
Operations	**Suggested**	Venues consider utilizing a software tool that can identify unattended bags.	5.2.4	
Operations	**Suggested**	Venues with either mutual aid agreements or the appropriate budget might consider the use of local law enforcement bomb or K-9 units to perform sweeps for the venue.	5.2.5	
Operations	**Suggested**	Certain venues also consider investing in their own K-9 unit for both scheduled and random sweeps prior to the event.	5.2.5	
Operations	**Suggested**	Venues consider incorporating camera facial recognition software if budget and threat determination warrant the expense.	5.3.1	
Operations	**Suggested**	Venues make temporary credentials substantially different from one event to another.	5.3.3	
Operations	**Suggested**	Venues implement simple policies including thoroughly securing food and ice storage areas and conducting in-house health inspections in addition to the locally required inspections, while more in-depth policies may include strict procedures for inspecting food containers prior to opening to ensure tampering did not occur.	5.3.4	
Operations	**Suggested**	Venues consider conducting anonymous surveys of staff to understand the impact of potential staffing reductions during incidents that match the threats identified in the risk assessment.	5.4.2	
Operations	**Suggested**	Venues study how well stadium employees and patrons react if an exit is closed or normal stadium egress is hindered in some limited manner (e.g. temporary construction or malfunction) and assess the impact on clearance time.	**5.4.2**	
Operations	**Suggested**	Venues consider involving outside groups such as law enforcement, fire, and OEM in any tabletop exercises they develop.	5.4.3	
Operations	**Suggested**	Venues consider the development of procedures to follow when planning for unique events that may require increased security.	5.4.3	

Functional Area	Assessment Level	Best Practice	Section	Feasibility
Training & Evaluation	**Suggested**	Venues consider providing additional materials for educating patrons on security screening processes.	6.1.5	
Training & Evaluation	**Suggested**	Venues educate patrons by utilizing signage and the PA system to inform patrons about expected behavior within the venue as well as what they can expect regarding access point inspections.	6.1.5	
Training & Evaluation	**Suggested**	Venues attempt to make patron entry more efficient by educating patrons to arrive early or even to provide incentives to arrive within a particular time range.	6.1.5	
Training & Evaluation	**Suggested**	Venue operators utilize randomization while applying QA to their security personnel.	6.2	
Training & Evaluation	**Suggested**	Venues introduce protocols to schedule varied forms of in-house search assessments.	6.2.1	
Training & Evaluation	**Suggested**	Venues include a mentor/apprentice program between veteran staffers and new hires.	6.2.2	

Functional Area	Assessment Level	Best Practice	Section	Feasibility
Risk Assessment	**Strongly Recommended**	Each venue conducts a risk assessment.	Intro	
Risk Assessment	**Strongly Recommended**	The venues collect information including but not limited to the venue's profile, threat evaluations and a catalogue of current safety measures and policies.	Intro	
Risk Assessment	**Strongly Recommended**	Static risk assessments be supplemented by establishing a Dynamic On-going Risk Assessment (DORA) process to enhance risk management capabilities.	Intro	
Risk Assessment	**Strongly Recommended**	A venue understands and be able to describe the risk assessment tool(s) and process used, including the methodology for assigning risk, to ensure the assessment is carried out properly.	Intro	
Risk Assessment	**Strongly Recommended**	The venues identify internal stakeholders involved in day-to-day operations and security who can be part of the [risk assessment] process.	2.1	
Risk Assessment	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues specify [as part of the venue profile] the ownership of not only the venue but also the owners of the property on which the venue is located and, if necessary, the owner(s) of the organization/team primarily utilizing the venue.	2.2	
Risk Assessment	**Strongly Recommended**	A venue develops a complete profile to include detailed lists and site locations of critical assets.	2.2	
Risk Assessment	**Strongly Recommended**	The venue profile includes some high level general facility information such as the facility name, owner/operator, address, GPS coordinates, size and capacity, and the basic facility operational purpose.	2.2	
Risk Assessment	**Strongly Recommended**	A description of the typical events that take place at the venue, their frequency and how the venue is used during those events be included in the venue profile.	2.2	
Risk Assessment	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues conducts an analysis, in coordination with the surrounding roadway management agencies, to understand the flow of vehicles and pedestrians as well as general traffic demand.	2.2	
Risk Assessment	**Strongly Recommended**	The traffic/transportation analysis includes the development of specific traffic flow egress maps for the venues that include specific egress routes for responding emergency vehicles and/or first responders.	2.2	
Risk Assessment	**Strongly Recommended**	The venue profile expands to describe the various [physical and personnel] critical assets.	2.2	
Risk Assessment	**Strongly Recommended**	The risk assessment includes a thorough threat assessment and be as inclusive as possible in its threat consideration.	2.3.1	

Functional Area	Assessment Level	Best Practice	Section	Feasibility
Risk Assessment	**Strongly Recommended**	Venue operators determines the relative likelihood of each threat occurring at the venue.	2.3.1	
Risk Assessment	**Strongly Recommended**	The risk assessment includes standard staffing plans and training for event and non-event days detailing the number of staff available, and their assigned	2.3.2	
Risk Assessment	**Strongly Recommended**	A risk assessment contains a detailed fire safety risk assessment and a medical response risk assessment.	2.3.2	
Risk Assessment	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues measure the security system's ability to detect a threat prior to an occurrence.	2.3.2	
Risk Assessment	**Strongly Recommended**	Consequences be considered (see Table 2 for some types of consequences).	2.3.2	
Risk Assessment	**Strongly Recommended**	The risk assessment team thoroughly identifies the available security control measures available to them on a regular basis and deployed based upon the results of the threat prioritization.	2.3.3	
Risk Assessment	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues identify potential interdependencies with surrounding infrastructures.	2.4	
Risk Assessment	**Strongly Recommended**	Continuous evaluation of the base-line risk assessment be carried out based on the quality assurance program implemented by the venue.	2.5.1	
Risk Assessment	**Strongly Recommended**	On-going re-assessment of the base-line risk assessment be done annually at a minimum.	2.5.1	
Risk Assessment	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues incorporate a Dynamic On-going Risk Assessment (DORA) process to address intelligence being received continuously, lessons learned from previous events and incidents, and unique events that may occur at the venue.	2.5.2	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Strongly Recommended**	A venue's incident response plan involves coordination and communication with public safety and public health officials, as well as the local JTTF (Joint Terrorism Task Force) and fusion centers where possible.	**3.1**	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Strongly Recommended**	Decisions on the roles and authority of involved agencies and individuals be made during security planning sessions and not during an incident.	3.1	

Functional Area	Assessment Level	Best Practice	Section	Feasibility
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues follow a model [for managing incidents] similar to the Incident Command Structure unified command model.	3.1	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Strongly Recommended**	Communication with outside groups remain open even during normal operating procedures.	3.1	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Strongly Recommended**	A venue identifies a centralized location as an operations center.	3.1	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Strongly Recommended**	The venue's command center be staffed by members of supporting and stakeholder agencies to efficiently communicate with security team members.	3.1	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues develop job descriptions for every employee.	3.2	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Strongly Recommended**	As part of the job descriptions, venues clarify who takes over certain roles if the individual originally in that position is not present or is incapacitated.	3.2	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Strongly Recommended**	A venue maintains a detailed staffing organization chart.	3.2	

Functional Area	Assessment Level	Best Practice	Section	Feasibility
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Strongly Recommended**	In-house security directors provide and communicate an organizational structure with contract labor management so response time efficiency is not eroded due to hierarchical confusion.	3.2	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Strongly Recommended**	A venue consider ways that the resiliency of the chain of command can be strengthened.	3.2	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues assess its ability to predict fan attendance accurately, and its ability to quickly add staff to respond to changes in the risk profile of an event.	3.3	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Strongly Recommended**	A venue considers ways of increasing the flexibility of the front-line workforce [to respond to severe weather, low staff turnout, etc.].	3.3	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues assess the importance of various security functions and analyze the ability of staff to perform the functions considered critical even under adverse conditions.	3.3	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues monitor security employment levels in order to identify issues before a lack of employees begins to affect other metrics of performance.	3.4.1	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Strongly Recommended**	A venue tracks employee turnover rates, and address the issue if rates become so high that they adversely affect the ability of the venue to fully implement the security plan.	3.4.1	

Functional Area	Assessment Level	Best Practice	Section	Feasibility
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Strongly Recommended**	A venue's human resources department institutes language into the employment contract for annual or bi-annual performance interviews with top security managers or directors.	3.4.1	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Strongly Recommended**	Security clearly defines which employees have the authority to grant credentials to employees, media and other groups, and that the credentialing process be written down and reviewed by security.	3.4.1	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Strongly Recommended**	A database of credentials granted be maintained.	3.4.1	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Strongly Recommended**	A venue considers how to limit the threat of an insider attack.	3.4.2	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Strongly Recommended**	A venue limits the access of employees to only what is determined necessary for their specific job.	**3.4.2**	
Information Management	**Strongly Recommended**	An internal communications structure and protocol be established as part of a sports venue security plan regardless of size or event type.	4.1.1.1	
Information Management	**Strongly Recommended**	Radio communications be monitored at the command center.	4.1.1.1	
Information Management	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues use a computer database to record features of incidents or communications that can then be used for later analysis.	4.1.1.2	
Information Management	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues arrange a direct line of contact to local law enforcement within the command center.	4.1.2.1	
Information Management	**Strongly Recommended**	The Security Director of the venue subscribes to a notification list in order to receive incident and threat notifications from the local fusion center, the Joint Terrorist Task Force (JTTF) or other federal alert systems.	4.1.2.1	

Functional Area	Assessment Level	Best Practice	Section	Feasibility
Information Management	**Strongly Recommended**	A direct line of contact be established with the local fire department as well as with the local medical center or hospital through telephone lines, personal contacts, emergency radios or several of the above.	4.1.2.2	
Information Management	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues have emergency medical personnel on staff during an event.	4.1.2.2	
Information Management	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues consider reserving one or more rooms as a medical center.	4.1.2.2	
Information Management	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues establish a channel of communication with nearby critical infrastructure sites.	4.1.2.3	
Information Management	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues establish contact with the local utility companies providing utility services to the venues.	4.1.2.3	
Information Management	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues have the use of an audio public address system in order to communicate with the patrons at the facility during a public event.	4.1.3.1	
Information Management	**Strongly Recommended**	Emergency messages include specific evacuation instructions, shelter in place instructions, incident notification and incident status updates (for example in the case of a blackout), and any other necessary information.	4.1.3.1	
Information Management	**Strongly Recommended**	Public address messages be prepared in advance of an emergency and ready for use.	4.1.3.1	
Information Management	**Strongly Recommended**	Each specific message be recorded in advance so that it may be played remotely if the public address announcer has to evacuate.	4.1.3.1	
Information Management	**Strongly Recommended**	The public address system be connected to the emergency generator, or some other power source so that it can continue to operate if electrical service is	4.1.3.1	
Information Management	**Strongly Recommended**	During an evacuation or other emergencies, the electronic message boards may be used to display evacuation instructions and guidance.	4.1.3.2	
Information Management	**Strongly Recommended**	Basic messages addressing a variety of potential emergency situations be prepared in advance so that they may be activated in case the area where messages are controlled has to be evacuated.	4.1.3.2	
Information Management	**Strongly Recommended**	If television monitors are in use, the visual quality and the size of the monitors be sufficient and that they are effectively and strategically placed at appropriate	4.1.3.3	
Information Management	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues employ the use of temporary or permanent signage to assist in crowd management in and around the venue.	4.1.3.4	

Functional Area	Assessment Level	Best Practice	Section	Feasibility
Information Management	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues protect and monitor computer systems and network infrastructure to be prepared against cyber-attacks.	**4.2.1**	
Information Management	**Strongly Recommended**	Computer systems be tested regularly and security reassessments be performed to help identify any potential vulnerabilities as well as assist in detecting any patterns of probing, hacking, or intrusions.	4.2.1	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Specific "zones" or concentric rings be established, for which there is a reasonable expectation that a certain level of security can be maintained within	Intro	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Training and exercises focus on [response operations] as part of the venue's training plan.	Intro	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Security tactics be implemented prior to, during, and after people access [parking] lots or structures.	5.1.1	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Security tactics include assigning staff to [parking] areas who are able to relay information to the command center.	5.1.1	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Vehicles parking within 100 feet of the venue structure be checked utilizing a detailed vehicle security screening process.	5.1.1	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Any public transportation systems that intersect the outer perimeter be addressed by venues in their security plans.	5.1.2	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues develop and implement a vendor and service provider security protocol to ensure only those cleared to pass through the outer perimeter can do so.	5.1.3	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues employ at least one of the following methods of patron screening: pat-down, wanding, magnetometer.	5.2.1	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues employ training and random tests of patron screening staff to mitigate [inconsistent or poor performance].	5.2.1	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues limit the possibility of magnetometers acting as an obstruction during an evacuation.	5.2.1	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues also screen bags upon entering stadiums.	5.2.1	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues estimate queue length at patron screening lines in order to assess the risk to patrons waiting in line to enter the stadium.	5.2.1	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	All vehicles requesting access to a loading dock at the venue undergo thorough screening.	5.2.2	

Functional Area	Assessment Level	Best Practice	Section	Feasibility
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Deliveries be allowed only if scheduled in advance.	5.2.2	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	The contents listed on the submitted and vetted manifest be reconciled with the contents of the vehicle or truck at the time of delivery.	5.2.2	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	The previously submitted and vetted driver's license of the delivery person match that of the person making the delivery.	5.2.2	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	All broadcast camera transfer cases either be removed to the broadcast truck, or secured and locked.	5.2.3	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	All media trucks and vehicles that are permitted to enter the premises of the venue be thoroughly inspected.	5.2.3	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Cameras be placed along the outside perimeter of the venue and at key vantage points within the [middle] zone that grant a view of the crowd, including	5.2.4	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Each sports venue incorporate into its security plan operational protocols for the purposes of sweeping by trained security staff.	5.2.5	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Regularly scheduled sweeps build upon incentive-based training scenarios so as to leverage continuity between exercise and practice.	5.2.5	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Pre-event sweeps include protocols to ensure that rooms, the merchandise and concession warehouse, and other venue spaces are properly swept as part of the pre-event process and/or response to a bomb threat.	5.2.5	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues have cameras installed that provide coverage for all major and minor areas within the venue – including blind corners, and that venues have the ability to store copious amounts of digital videotape footage captured by the	5.3.1	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	All sports venues perform manned sweeps before every event to look for suspicious items including signs of equipment tampering.	5.3.2	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Sweeps [of the inner security zone] incorporate a random check of food vendor product as it is unloaded from the vendor truck to the product storage within	5.3.2	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	All sports venues draft a plan that clearly defines areas and access points for all personnel within the hierarchy.	5.3.3	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues draft proper signage indicating to patrons which areas within the inner zone they can access and which they cannot.	5.3.3	

Functional Area	Assessment Level	Best Practice	Section	Feasibility
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues use credentialing to assist in limiting employee and patron access to appropriate areas.	5.3.3	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Color coding on credentials be used to delineate clearly the access levels of an employee, and that a photo also be present on the ID to ensure its use by the	5.3.3	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues implement mail-handling security policies based upon guidance by the United States Postal Service.	5.3.4	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Every venue have an incident response plan, at minimum formalizing in writing the existing unwritten plans.	5.4.1	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Incident response plan policies and procedures be drilled regularly.	5.4.1	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Government agency best practices be incorporated into [the venue's] incident response plans as appropriate.	5.4.1	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Evacuation and shelter-in-place plans be a core component of the security incident plans developed to support response capabilities.	5.4.1	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	A plan for handling the possibility of mass fatalities be developed.	5.4.1	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues develop procedures and metrics for quickly determining whether an evacuation is necessary.	5.4.2	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues maintain statistics on end of event clearance time, in order to estimate how quickly an evacuation might be possible.	**5.4.2**	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues prioritize development of specific incident plans based on their potential threat as identified in the risk assessment.	5.4.3	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues develop comprehensive evacuation plans.	5.4.3	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues use tabletop exercises as a way to test and develop incident management plans.	5.4.3	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues participate in tabletop exercises with quantifiable metrics of performance.	5.4.3	
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	Tabletop exercises be as realistic as possible.	5.4.3	

Functional Area	Assessment Level	Best Practice	Section	Feasibility
Operations	**Strongly Recommended**	The security management of a venue include venue management in incident response planning.	5.4.3	
Training & Evaluation	**Strongly Recommended**	Security managers at sports venues know of be able to access their state's guard certification requirements, especially when hiring contracted security vendors.	6.1.1	
Training & Evaluation	**Strongly Recommended**	The venue security director establish a set of minimum competency standards for security practices.	6.1.2	
Training & Evaluation	**Strongly Recommended**	Minimum competency standards be applicable to all employees at a venue.	6.1.2	
Training & Evaluation	**Strongly Recommended**	Venues establish an introductory tour and assessment for contract guards so as to increase contract guards' familiarity with the venue and its unique features as part of a comprehensive training program.	6.1.2	
Training & Evaluation	**Strongly Recommended**	Training be thought of as a constant activity that helps keep venue staff alert, informed, and engaged through the acquisition of new information.	6.1.3	
Training & Evaluation	**Strongly Recommended**	All venue staff, including security staff, both contracted and in–house, guest services staff, maintenance staff, custodial personnel, parking staff, and food vendors receive some level of training designed by the venue security director.	6.1.3	
Training & Evaluation	**Strongly Recommended**	Training include both an educational component and a testing component.	6.1.3	
Training & Evaluation	**Strongly Recommended**	The results of training examinations be recorded and maintained as part of employee files.	6.1.3	
Training & Evaluation	**Strongly Recommended**	Refresher training sessions be held regularly.	6.1.3	
Training & Evaluation	**Strongly Recommended**	Pre-season training occur and at minimum include customer service training but ideally also include higher level incident response training for all levels of employees.	6.1.4	
Training & Evaluation	**Strongly Recommended**	After Action Reports (AARs) be used properly, i.e. noting deficiencies and then following up with action (accountability) to improve deficiencies prior to the next exercise or event.	6.1.4	
Training & Evaluation	**Strongly Recommended**	The AAR and discovered areas of weaknesses or areas for improvement be used to drive the objectives for the next training exercise.	6.1.4	
Training & Evaluation	**Strongly Recommended**	Patrons of a venue be educated on emergency procedures prior to the start of each event.	6.1.5	

Functional Area	Assessment Level	Best Practice	Section	Feasibility
Training & Evaluation	**Strongly Recommended**	Every sport venue security plan incorporate some form of basic red teaming to assess their front-line personnel.	6.2.1	
Training & Evaluation	**Strongly Recommended**	A venue has a clearly drawn and readily accessible organizational chart to clarify responsibility for auditing performance.	6.2.2	
Training & Evaluation	**Strongly Recommended**	All aspects of the performance of security management (organization skill, supervisory capabilities, and leadership) be audited and rewarded appropriately by whomever the manager reports to in the organization.	6.2.2	
Risk Assessment	**Recommended**	The scale of the risk assessment carried out (the number and kinds of internal and external stakeholders involved, the number of consultants employed (if any), the deployment of security technologies, etc.) be appropriately sized for	**Intro**	
Risk Assessment	**Recommended**	League officials become familiar with assessments of risk that pertain to all league venues and also those risks specific to unique venues or venue	Intro	
Risk Assessment	**Recommended**	External stakeholders for the risk assessment process include local law enforcement, emergency medical services providers, fire services providers (including the fire marshal) and other first responders who may respond to an	2.1	
Risk Assessment	**Recommended**	The traffic/transportation analysis includes the identification of hot spots or critical intersections where traffic and crowds build.	2.2	
Risk Assessment	**Recommended**	The critical assets be described so that their importance to operations is highlighted, so that this information can feed into the risk assessment.	2.2	
Risk Assessment	**Recommended**	A detailed site-layout plan also be developed depicting all structures on the premises, and the locations of emergency response equipment specifically identifying on venue maps the locations of fire extinguishers, fire hoses, pull stations and related fire/life safety equipment along with the location of	2.2	
Risk Assessment	**Recommended**	Venues consider conducting research into incidents which have occurred nationally or internationally through established terrorism databases, potential incidents that have occurred at the venue operator's facility or an in-kind facility, or may have been deterred or stopped by current security measures.	2.3.1	
Risk Assessment	**Recommended**	The ability for response systems to surge during mass fatality incidents and other major threats be identified.	2.3.2	
Risk Assessment	**Recommended**	The vulnerability assessment includes inherent facility design flaws that a terrorist may exploit to increase the consequences of an attack.	2.3.2	

Functional Area	Assessment Level	Best Practice	Section	Feasibility
Risk Assessment	**Recommended**	Venues consider attacks from various originating access points such as vehicles, persons, air-borne attacks, and water-based attacks.	2.3.2	
Risk Assessment	**Recommended**	Venues consider their ability to respond and recover from an incident as part of their vulnerability assessments.	2.3.2	
Risk Assessment	**Recommended**	Venues consider how a threat may cause economic impacts [in addition to human casualties].	2.3.2	
Risk Assessment	**Recommended**	Other consequences such as cascading effects on interdependent infrastructures and resources be considered.	2.3.2	
Risk Assessment	**Recommended**	Venues expand the risk assessment further to detail how an expected and anticipated variation to each event impacts the prioritization and risks posed to	2.3.3	
Risk Assessment	**Recommended**	Utility providers also be reviewed. [How to address loss of electricity, gas, or water should a utility be attacked or fail?] What sort of impact might an attack or failure within the venue have on the utility provider?	2.4	
Risk Assessment	**Recommended**	A review of infrastructure interdependencies includes support service facilities such as food and drink vendors, local hotels and motels and parking structure	2.4	
Risk Assessment	**Recommended**	All facilities that pose a risk to the venue if an incident occurs at that facility be included in the analysis of infrastructure interdependencies.	2.4	
Risk Assessment	**Recommended**	Venues share the results with law enforcement agencies with direct jurisdictional responsibilities and, if deemed appropriate, escalate the results to higher levels of government and law enforcement.	2.5.1	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Recommended**	A venue considers how insulated their on-site security center is.	3.1	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Recommended**	The venue try to keep the public from accessing the location of the command center and other areas crucial to the implementation of the security plan and the response to any security incidents.	3.1	

Functional Area	Assessment Level	Best Practice	Section	Feasibility
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	Recommended	A secondary, remote command center be set up, if an event is especially large or identified as particularly at risk for a terrorist attack.	3.1	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	Recommended	Venues consider how frequently they reiterate and review unified command structure and planning, and how often they run joint tabletop exercises.	3.1	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	Recommended	A structure be in place to identify and brief newly appointed individuals on their role in incident command operations whenever turnover internally or in outside agencies does take place.	3.1	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	Recommended	Venues design contingency plans in case lines of communication are not available during an emergency.	3.1	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	Recommended	A test of the strength of the unified command system, be it through a tabletop exercise or some other method, include measuring both the speed with which decisions are made as well as the validity of the decisions.	3.1	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	Recommended	Smaller venues and smaller leagues seek out a larger, more established venue to observe their security procedures and develop a point of contact to consult with on security issues.	3.1	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	Recommended	Employees be given index cards or some other job aid to help remind them what their responsibilities are during an event and what is expected of them during an emergency situation.	3.2	

Functional Area	Assessment Level	Best Practice	Section	Feasibility
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Recommended**	Entries in the credentials granted database be randomly audited to ensure that credentials are being properly distributed.	3.4.1	
Information Management	**Recommended**	A system of channel assignment be employed, so as not to crowd any single channel with excessive traffic.	**4.1.1.1**	
Information Management	**Recommended**	Radios be checked before being needed for events.	4.1.1.1	
Information Management	**Recommended**	First responders, including law enforcement, test the capabilities of their radio systems within all areas of the venue at least annually to ensure their	4.1.1.1	
Information Management	**Recommended**			
Information Management	**Recommended**	Protocols be instituted for incident reporting following any type of disturbance at the venue, such as public intoxication, physical altercation, underage alcohol consumption, drug use, and illegal ticket sales.	4.1.1.2	
Information Management	**Recommended**	Written communication, either paper or electronic, be used as a channel from staff to management regarding areas that require improvement or signal a need	4.1.1.2	
Information Management	**Recommended**	If an emergency telephone reporting system is in place that it be coupled with a system of identification that indicates the precise location of the phone from	4.1.1.4	
Information Management	**Recommended**	A wired telephone independent of the facility's system be installed in the command center in case the system is compromised.	4.1.1.4	
Information Management	**Recommended**	Venues include a law enforcement presence in the command center from federal authorities as well as local law enforcement.	4.1.2.1	
Information Management	**Recommended**	Venues employ a paid law enforcement detail during event day operations.	4.1.2.1	
Information Management	**Recommended**	An EMS representative as well as a representative from the local fire department be stationed inside the command center during events.	4.1.2.2	
Information Management	**Recommended**	Venue representatives establish a point of contact at a critical infrastructure site with a person holding the authority to make necessary operational decisions	4.1.2.3	
Information Management	**Recommended**	Venues periodically verify the point of contact at infrastructure sites and update the contact information if necessary.	4.1.2.3	

Functional Area	Assessment Level	Best Practice	Section	Feasibility
Information Management	**Recommended**	The Director of Security or the Director's designee takes responsibility for composing the content of the message during an emergency when pre-recorded	4.1.3.1	
Information Management	**Recommended**	If electronic message boards are in use, the system be utilized during non-emergency situations to regularly test its functionality.	4.1.3.2	
Information Management	**Recommended**	If television monitors are in use, the system be utilized during non-emergency situations to regularly test its functionality.	4.1.3.3	
Information Management	**Recommended**	Permanent signage provide emergency contact information, incident or suspicious item reporting telephone numbers, evacuation routes and exits, and the location of emergency equipment.	4.1.3.4	
Information Management	**Recommended**	Posted signage be used at the entrances for queuing and patron screening procedures, e.g. to identify objects that are restricted or prohibited from the	4.1.3.4	
Information Management	**Recommended**	Venues consider establishing a text messaging system that provides patrons with a number to which they can text a complaint or report of a disturbance.	4.1.3.5	
Information Management	**Recommended**	If guest text messaging is in use at the venue, a database of reported incidents be maintained for analysis.	4.1.3.5	
Information Management	**Recommended**	Venues consider having an online presence through social platforms such as Twitter, Facebook or Instagram.	4.1.3.6	
Information Management	**Recommended**	If venues use social media, they engage patrons in discussions prior to events, answer questions and concerns, as well as provide relevant event day	4.1.3.6	
Information Management	**Recommended**	Protocols be developed for ingesting, evaluating, and acting upon reports of various kinds (e.g. "See something, say something").	4.1.3.6	
Information Management	**Recommended**	Venues build a plan to mitigate cyber-security risks.	4.2.1	
Information Management	**Recommended**	Cyber-security technologies be used to ensure that system processes are functioning properly, data is not compromised, and information can be	**4.2.1**	
Operations	**Recommended**	Some assigned staff [in parking areas] include patrols of trained security or law enforcement personnel.	5.1.1	
Operations	**Recommended**	Patrols [in parking lots] be on foot and visit locations in random order.	5.1.1	
Operations	**Recommended**	All [parking] lots be surrounded by physical infrastructure such as fences, trees or walls, and that a network of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras be used to support monitoring and response.	5.1.1	

Functional Area	Assessment Level	Best Practice	Section	Feasibility
Operations	Recommended	Vehicles be kept at least 100 feet away from the facility whenever possible.	5.1.1	
Operations	Recommended	Venues use clear garbage cans with clear liners and have security personnel check them regularly during an event.	5.1.1	
Operations	Recommended	All vendors provide a list of personnel and their vehicles, plate numbers, and other information for verification.	5.1.3	
Operations	Recommended	Access for mail, deliveries, and non-essential repairs be cut off well in advance of the event start time.	5.1.3	
Operations	Recommended	Some method is employed to lessen the risk that a bag could be used as a container to deliver an IED.	5.2.1	
Operations	Recommended	Simulation and modeling be used to understand and project variations in screening, and in patron behavior.	5.2.1	
Operations	Recommended	Venues attempt to modify fan behavior to reduce queue lines and track the success of various [incentive] programs.	5.2.1	
Operations	Recommended	Venues set and meet queue size goals.	5.2.1	
Operations	Recommended	Vehicle screening include a survey of the vehicle undercarriage as well as of the vehicle contents including the trunk of any vehicle and both the inside and	5.2.2	
Operations	Recommended	Delivery vehicles be screened for explosives using the K-9 unit if one is	5.2.2	
Operations	Recommended	Delivery vehicles be swiped for the detection of explosive materials if no K-9 unit is available.	5.2.2	
Operations	Recommended	The screening of media trucks include a survey of the vehicle's contents.	5.2.3	
Operations	Recommended	Cameras [placed in the middle security zone] be monitored at the command	5.2.4	
Operations	Recommended	All personnel monitoring the cameras be trained in how to detect suspicious activity and behavior.	5.2.4	
Operations	Recommended	Cameras be trained on key air intake and electrical delivery systems so as to help harden security against the introduction of a chemical or biological agents into the system or disrupting venue power.	5.2.4	
Operations	Recommended	The plan [defining areas and access points for all personnel within the hierarchy] correspond to key-card level access, if such a system is in place.	5.3.3	
Operations	Recommended	Certain venues with unique footprints and appropriate budgets incorporate alarm systems that trigger when unauthorized entry is made through access	5.3.3	

Functional Area	Assessment Level	Best Practice	Section	Feasibility
Operations	Recommended	Smart card technology be used, since this technology can assist in tracking employee movements and monitoring for suspicious behavior.	5.3.3	
Operations	Recommended	Venue security review the protocol concerning who gets what kind of credentials and how those are verified.	5.3.3	
Operations	Recommended	Venues establish food security policies which address the entire supply chain beyond just the inner security zone.	5.3.4	
Operations	Recommended	Venues try to minimize the number of decisions that are not predetermined.	5.4.2	
Operations	Recommended	Testing of [evacuation] procedures be done via tabletop exercises, and also that plans be developed in consultation with public partners.	5.4.2	
Operations	Recommended	Venue use the tools at their disposal to prepare fans for potential evacuation before the start of an event.	5.4.2	
Operations	Recommended	Venues place staff in positions to assist patrons needing to move throughout	5.4.2	
Operations	Recommended	If these staff [those assisting patrons needing to move] are not security personnel they still receive briefings and training on procedures for an	5.4.2	
Operations	Recommended	Venues monitor major egress routes for anomalies throughout an event.	5.4.2	
Operations	Recommended	Venues coordinate with local authorities, especially transit agencies, to be sure that crowds can disperse quickly in both evacuation and normal end of event	5.4.2	
Operations	Recommended	Venues monitor and sweep outside areas where large numbers of fans are likely to congregate or pass through after an event.	5.4.2	
Operations	Recommended	Venues develop a set of general response principles that can then be applied to whatever incidents do develop, in combination with specific response plans.	5.4.3	
Operations	Recommended	Venue managers be prepared for what to say and do publicly in an emergency.	5.4.3	
Operations	Recommended	Security at a venue advise venue management, which is usually civilian, how to interact with outside agencies in the event that these agencies must come in and take over command of venue security.	5.4.3	
Training & Evaluation	Recommended	Various levels of higher proficiency [beyond minimum competency] in security procedures be instituted.	6.1.2	
Training & Evaluation	Recommended	The positions be clearly defined as to which positions this tiered set of [minimum to higher-level] practices applies.	6.1.2	
Training & Evaluation	Recommended	Security managers consider implementing short (5-minute) refresher training modules for both in-house and contract security on a daily or weekly basis.	6.1.2	

Functional Area	Assessment Level	Best Practice	Section	Feasibility
Training & Evaluation	**Recommended**	Once every six months is an appropriate timetable for training refresher courses.	6.1.3	
Training & Evaluation	**Recommended**	Venue operators consider: Many resources are available to the local security director through federal agencies.	6.1.3	
Training & Evaluation	**Recommended**	Venue operators consider: Mutual aid agreements between the venue operator or security director and local law enforcement that can include tabletop exercises to provide benefits for both parties.	6.1.3	
Training & Evaluation	**Recommended**	Venue operators consider: Coordinated training efforts help to not only establish strong positive ties between the venue and local fire and law enforcement services, but also the relationship can speed up effective coordinated incident management during actual incidents.	6.1.3	
Training & Evaluation	**Recommended**	A challenge program be used – if an employee sees someone carrying out a procedure incorrectly and reports it, the employee is rewarded. In addition, when an employee notices that another employee has correctly followed procedure, they can also be rewarded for their knowledge and awareness.	6.1.3	
Training & Evaluation	**Recommended**	Some exercises endeavor to involve as many players, entities, partners, and stakeholders as possible.	6.1.4	
Training & Evaluation	**Recommended**	Training be an ongoing process that can be budgeted on an annual basis.	6.1.4	
Training & Evaluation	**Recommended**			
Training & Evaluation	**Recommended**	Short, 5-minute, topic training sessions be given 15 minutes prior to an event (just-in-time training) to keep information fresh, in addition to the semi-annual refresher training.	6.1.4	
Training & Evaluation	**Recommended**			
Training & Evaluation	**Recommended**	[Patron] training be in the form of a brief informational video and/or a printed pamphlet describing evacuation routes and instructions for sheltering in place.	6.1.5	
Training & Evaluation	**Recommended**	Venues using wands develop testing protocols for wands and their users including basic strategies for read-teaming.	6.2.1	

Functional Area	Assessment Level	Best Practice	Section	Feasibility
Risk Assessment	**Suggested**	Venues provide additional details about the venue's ownership structure, legal requirements and standards, and security funding mechanism(s) in those instances where not-for-profit (NFP) agencies own part or all of the venue, the property, or the team or organization primarily using the venue.	**2.2**	
Risk Assessment	**Suggested**	Venues also consider criticality, accessibility, the ability to recover from threats, and the ability to recognize threats.	2.3.2	
Risk Assessment	**Suggested**	Visible vulnerability be addressed. Should a terrorist be able to gather intelligence through reconnaissance and identify the location of critical systems, those systems become more vulnerable.	2.3.2	
Risk Assessment	**Suggested**	Consequence identification include the length of time it will take for the venue to begin operating again and the time it will take to recover fully.	2.3.2	
Risk Assessment	**Suggested**	Environmental impacts [consequences] be addressed.	2.3.2	
Risk Assessment	**Suggested**	Risk assessments be updated more frequently than once per year, and may include pre-, mid-, and/or postseason reviews.	2.5.1	
Risk Assessment	**Suggested**	Venues consider developing a cost benefit analysis procedure that allows decision makers to effectively manage risk.	**2.5.2**	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Suggested**	Venues contact nearby locations to determine if any [collaborative] partnerships could be mutually beneficial.	3.1	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Suggested**	Venues train staff for multiple roles in order to increase the flexibility of the workforce.	3.3	
Staffing: Leadership, Organization and Authority	**Suggested**	The updating of background checks be done at random as well as whenever there are indicators of a re-check (e.g. employees who show up driving expensive vehicles clearly outside their apparent economic means).	**3.4.2**	
Information Management	**Suggested**	Venue operators consider the use of multi-channel radios for internal communication for ALL staff.	4.1.1.1	

Functional Area	Assessment Level	Best Practice	Section	Feasibility
Information Management	**Suggested**	Coded messages be used so as not to instill panic in patrons.	4.1.1.1	
Information Management	**Suggested**	Venues consider whether electronic or paper-based communication should be utilized to apprise security staff of known threats prior to an event.	4.1.1.2	
Information Management	**Suggested**	Venues consider the use of an emergency paging system.	4.1.1.3	
Information Management	**Suggested**	A venue investigate available technical solutions if cellular call volume causes network overload.	4.1.1.4	
Information Management	**Suggested**	Venues verify contact information at nearby infrastructure sites at least semi-annually.	4.1.2.3	
Information Management	**Suggested**	Pictorial depictions be used on signs to help patrons, including those with limited proficiency in English, understand and remember what items are	**4.1.3.4**	
Information Management	**Suggested**	If a text messaging system is in use, this system be considered for the dissemination of information to patrons during an emergency.	4.1.3.5	
Operations	**Suggested**	Some of [the staff assigned to parking lots] be in plain clothes to allow for their integration into parking lot activities without drawing the attention of suspicious persons and that some of them be trained in behavioral assessment.	5.1.1	
Operations	**Suggested**	Vehicles parking [more than 100 feet] away from the structure [also] be checked utilizing a detailed vehicle security screening process [in addition to	5.1.1	
Operations	**Suggested**	Venues consider integrating license plate reader devices at parking access points to identify potential threats.	5.1.1	
Operations	**Suggested**	Venues with larger budgets devoted to security development consider the following pilot program on a small scale: Set up target vehicle parking areas in which vehicles in high risk of drawing criminal activity or identified by intelligence reports may be located in sight of parking lot staff. Alternatively, staff may be assigned to monitor vehicles if parking in these target areas is not	5.1.1	
Operations	**Suggested**	Visiting teams be inspected off-site [for sports events].	5.1.3	
Operations	**Suggested**	Venues located near airports and venues having established flight takeoff or approach paths over them coordinate with airport officials and the Federal Aviation Administration to see if alternative paths are available during event-	5.1.4	

Functional Area	Assessment Level	Best Practice	Section	Feasibility
Operations	**Suggested**	A venue consider using a combination of methods in patron screening in order to take advantage of the value of the most effective screening techniques, and the speed of alternative techniques.	5.2.1	
Operations	**Suggested**	Venues consider rotating staff in and out of the busiest and most stressful patron screening jobs.	5.2.1	
Operations	**Suggested**	Guidelines to limit the size of bags be established, taking into account the needs of patrons along with the venue risk assessment.	5.2.1	
Operations	**Suggested**	Venues provide incentives for those coming without bags, for instance moving those patrons to faster-moving inspection lanes.	5.2.1	
Operations	**Suggested**	Venues consider employing more patron screeners and/or training screeners more thoroughly to maximize their effectiveness and speed.	5.2.1	
Operations	**Suggested**	Venues consider developing incentives [for patrons] to arrive earlier and/or arrive at less busy gates.	5.2.1	
Operations	**Suggested**	Venues consider employing a patron screening strategy that is responsive to queue size; for example switching procedures or randomizing procedures if the	5.2.1	
Operations	**Suggested**	Venues consider cutting off access to a gate if the queue size at the gate gets	5.2.1	
Operations	**Suggested**	Venues study and potentially pilot a program for expedited screening of season ticket holders and other trusted patrons, possibly patterned after the TSA	5.2.1	
Operations	**Suggested**	Media personnel be screened separately in order to allow a careful and attentive screening of equipment and credentials.	5.2.3	
Operations	**Suggested**	Venues may wish to consider a separate entrance for media personnel access.	5.2.3	
Operations	**Suggested**	A combination of devoted camera and positioned security personnel at key intakes or electrical stations be deployed.	5.2.4	
Operations	**Suggested**	The venue consider moving cameras from time to time, perhaps using randomized placement.	5.2.4	
Operations	**Suggested**	Venues consider utilizing a software tool that can identify unattended bags.	5.2.4	
Operations	**Suggested**	Venues with either mutual aid agreements or the appropriate budget might consider the use of local law enforcement bomb or K-9 units to perform	5.2.5	
Operations	**Suggested**	Certain venues also consider investing in their own K-9 unit for both scheduled and random sweeps prior to the event.	5.2.5	

Functional Area	Assessment Level	Best Practice	Section	Feasibility
Operations	**Suggested**	Venues consider incorporating camera facial recognition software if budget and threat determination warrant the expense.	5.3.1	
Operations	**Suggested**	Venues make temporary credentials substantially different from one event to	5.3.3	
Operations	**Suggested**	Venues implement simple policies including thoroughly securing food and ice storage areas and conducting in-house health inspections in addition to the locally required inspections, while more in-depth policies may include strict procedures for inspecting food containers prior to opening to ensure tampering	5.3.4	
Operations	**Suggested**	Venues consider conducting anonymous surveys of staff to understand the impact of potential staffing reductions during incidents that match the threats identified in the risk assessment.	5.4.2	
Operations	**Suggested**	Venues study how well stadium employees and patrons react if an exit is closed or normal stadium egress is hindered in some limited manner (e.g. temporary construction or malfunction) and assess the impact on clearance time.	**5.4.2**	
Operations	**Suggested**	Venues consider involving outside groups such as law enforcement, fire, and OEM in any tabletop exercises they develop.	5.4.3	
Operations	**Suggested**	Venues consider the development of procedures to follow when planning for unique events that may require increased security.	5.4.3	
Training & Evaluation	**Suggested**	Venues consider providing additional materials for educating patrons on security screening processes.	6.1.5	
Training & Evaluation	**Suggested**	Venues educate patrons by utilizing signage and the PA system to inform patrons about expected behavior within the venue as well as what they can expect regarding access point inspections.	6.1.5	
Training & Evaluation	**Suggested**	Venues attempt to make patron entry more efficient by educating patrons to arrive early or even to provide incentives to arrive within a particular time	6.1.5	
Training & Evaluation	**Suggested**	Venue operators utilize randomization while applying QA to their security personnel.	6.2	
Training & Evaluation	**Suggested**	Venues introduce protocols to schedule varied forms of in-house search assessments.	6.2.1	
Training & Evaluation	**Suggested**	Venues include a mentor/apprentice program between veteran staffers and new hires.	6.2.2	

Section	Questions	Metric
2.0	Was a risk assessment conducted?	Y/N
2.0	Was the risk assessment self-conducted?	Y/N
2.0	Was a contractor used to support the risk assessment development?	Y/N
2.0	Was an off-the-shelf, free or purchased risk assessment tool used?	Y/N
2.0	Is a risk assessment conducted for each event?	Y/N
2.0	What methodological approach did the venue take?	Methodology Description
2.0	What risk assessment tools were utilized in development of the risk assessment?	Tool Identification
2.0	What is done with the risk assessment? How is it used and implemented? Who knows of it and uses it?	Description of the Uses of the Risk Assessment
2.1	Was a risk assessment team formed?	Y/N
2.1	How many people were on the risk assessment team?	#
2.1	What was the ratio of external to internal members of the risk assessment team?	:
2.1	In what percentage of revisions of the risk assessment were outsiders involved?	%
2.2	Does the venue detail the ownership structure of the venue structure, property and/or primary team(s) utilizing the venue?	Y/N
2.2	How many events occurred at the venue in the past year?	#
2.2	What was the average attendance of these events?	#
2.2	What is the maximum capacity by event type?	#
2.2	Does the venue have a list of critical asset descriptions?	Y/N
2.2	Does the venue asset description identify its importance to operations?	Y/N
2.2	Do asset descriptions include a list of personnel who have access?	Y/N
2.2	Do asset descriptions describe the asset's visibility and recognizability?	Y/N

Section	Questions	Metric
2.2	Do asset descriptions identify the asset's maintenance requirements?	Y/N
2.2	Describe the typical events the facility conducts.	Venue Functional Purpose Description
2.3	Has a thorough threat assessment been conducted describing each potential threat as part of the risk assessment?	Y/N
2.3	What is the estimated likelihood for each threat to occur?	:
2.3	Were the threats cross-checked with other risk assessments carried out by local municipalities, county, or state?	Y/N
2.3	How were incident likelihoods determined?	Describe process for determining threat likelihood.
2.3.2	List the consequences of each threat by incident type in terms of deaths and injuries.	#
2.3.2	List the consequences of each threat by incident type in terms of economic loss.	$
2.3.2	List the consequence of each threat by incident type in the time it will take the venue to recover to full operation.	t
2.3.2	Does the risk assessment identify environmental consequences?	Y/N
2.3.2	Does the risk assessment identify public health consequences?	Y/N
2.3.2	Was a fire safety assessment completed as part of the overall risk assessment?	Y/N
2.3.2	Was a medical response assessment completed as part of the overall risk assessment?	Y/N
2.3.2	Describe how the threats identified impact/relate to the facility's vulnerability for each incident type.	Detailed vulnerability assessment.
2.3.2	How were the threats prioritized in the risk assessment?	Description of risk assessment valuation of threats including estimated likelihoods and consequences.

Section	Questions	Metric
2.3.2	How were the consequences compared across the threats analyzed (e.g. how were human consequences compared to economic consequences)?	Description of comparison analysis conducted between consequences to support threat prioritization and risk management decisions.
2.3.2	How were the economic consequences calculated and what do they represent (venue loss, local economic loss, league loss, regional loss, etc.)?	Description on the criteria and formulas used to calculate the economic consequences.
2.3.2	What criteria were used for assigning consequence values?	Description of inputs used to assign values.
2.3.2	What do the consequence values represent?	Definition of what the value means.
2.3.2	What criteria were used for assigning vulnerability values?	Description of inputs used to assign values.
2.3.2	What do the vulnerability values represent?	Definition of what the value means.
2.3.3	Does the risk assessment identify the available security control measures available to the venue on a regular basis?	Y/N
2.3.3	Are resources deployed based on the risk assessment?	Y/N
2.3.3	Does the risk assessment describe how the variations in the event timing, demographics and weather impact the results of the risk assessment?	Y/N
2.3.3	Describe how these control measures are deployed against the risk assessment for the base-line security plan.	Description of facility resource deployment plan.
2.4	Does the risk assessment identify potential cascading consequences from incidents at interdependent infrastructures?	Y/N
2.4	Does the risk assessment address area transportation systems?	Y/N
2.4	Does the risk assessment address area utility providers?	Y/N
2.4	Does the risk assessment address area hospitals?	Y/N
2.4	Does the risk assessment address vendor facilities?	Y/N

Section	Questions	Metric
2.4	Does the risk assessment address area parking lots/garages?	Y/N
2.4	Does the risk assessment address area hotel and motels?	Y/N
2.4	Does the risk assessment address those facilities identified within the list of potential incidents?	Y/N
2.5.1	How often does the venue conduct a re-assessment or review of the base-line risk assessment?	Freq.
2.5.1	When was the original base-line risk assessment completed?	Date
2.5.1	When was the last base-line risk assessment updated?	Date
2.5.1	Has the law enforcement agency with primary jurisdiction been notified of the risk assessment results (and on-going updates to the risk assessment)?	Y/N
2.5.1	Does the venue share the results of the base-line risk assessment with local or state law enforcement?	Y/N
2.5.2	Has the venue developed a DORA process?	Y/N
2.5.2	Does this process address the redeployment of security control measures?	Y/N
2.5.2	Does this process include a cost-benefit analysis for deploying/re-deploying additional resources?	Y/N
2.5.2	Does the venue implement a corrective action process in response to an incident based after action reports?	Y/N
2.5.2	Is an event-day risk assessment developed?	Y/N
2.5.2	For unique events, does the venue conduct a suitability assessment?	Y/N
2.5.2	Who conducts this event-day/week assessment?	List of Agency(s) or Staff Position(s)
2.5.2	How does the venue ensure these corrective actions are implemented?	Description of Implementation

Section	Questions	Metric
2.5.2	Describe the integration of the new intelligence into the base-line risk assessment?	Description of new intelligence use against base-line risk assessment.

Section	Questions	Metric
3.1 3.1 3.1	Are tabletop exercises done in coordination with local law enforcement, public health and other relevant agencies? How many times per year are tabletop exercises done?	Y/N, Freq.
3.1 3.1	How many times per year are incident response plans reviewed with relevant outside agencies?	Freq.
3.1 3.1	Are measurements in place for both the speed and validity of the decision making process in a unified command situation?	Y/N
3.1 3.1	Are procedures in place to identify and brief new points of contact and leadership elements both internally and in outside agencies?	Y/N
3.1 3.1	Has the security of the command center been studied?	Y/N
3.1 3.1	How close to the command center are patron accessible areas?	#
3.1 3.1	Is there a secondary, remote command center for some events?	Y/N
3.1 3.1	How many individuals (employees) have access to the command center?	#
3.1 3.1	Have nearby venues been contacted to explore possible collaborative partnerships?	Y/N
3.2	Does the venue have a Continuity of Operations Plan?	Y/N
3.2	Are security personnel removed from tabletop exercises to test the resiliency of the chain of command? Are they removed at random and without warning?	Y/N , Y/N
3.2	Are staffing levels tested for their projected performance during various conceivable scenarios such as severe weather?	Y/N
3.2	What is the Supervisor to Staff ratio?	:
3.2	Are employees provided a clear, concise job description?	Y/N
3.2	Are employees provided job aids to carry with them and remind them what to do in various circumstances?	Y/N

Section	Questions	Metric
3.3	Past predicted and actual attendance	Comparison
3.3	Past predicted number and actual number of security incidents	Comparison
3.3	Have the importance of various security priorities been ranked, and have priorities of crucial importance been identified? At what percentage level of front-line staffing can all functions of crucial importance be met?	Y/N, %
3.4.1 3.4.1	What is the monthly/yearly employee turnover rate for various positions?	%
3.4.1	What are current staffing levels and estimated current staffing needs?	Comparison
3.4.1	Is it clear who has the authority to grant credentials?	Y/N
3.4.1	Is a database of credentials maintained?	Y/N
3.4.1	Are credentials randomly audited to ensure proper distribution?	Y/N
3.4.2	What is the number of access levels?	#
3.4.2	Can a red-team of employees access off-limit areas?	Y/N
3.4.2 3.4.2	What are the repossession rates of terminated employees' badges/keys/uniforms/etc.	%
3.4.2	Can a red-team access the venue, or pass through secondary screening, with outdated or terminated credentials?	Y/N
3.4.2	Are repeated background checks run on potential employees? If so, how often?	Y/N, Freq.

Section	Questions	Metric
4.1	Is there a protocol for internal communication?	Y/N
4.1	External communication?	Y/N
4.1	Public communication?	Y/N
4.1	Identify the protocol for internal communication, external communication, and public communication.	Descriptions of communication protocols
4.1	List the entity-pairs that have a communication link identified in each protocol.	List of sender/receiver pairs
4.1.1.1	Are radios utilized for communication among venue staff?	Y/N
4.1.1.1	What percentage of employees is provided radios?	%
4.1.1.1	Do channels include a direct law enforcement channel?	Y/N
4.1.1.1	Are coded messages used for radio communications?	Y/N
4.1.1.1	How often are radios tested?	Freq.
4.1.1.1	Is a backup supply of radio batteries readily available?	Y/N
4.1.1.1	Identify the type of radios used at the venue.	List of radio types
4.1.1.1	Describe the channel assignment structure.	Channel assignment list
4.1.1.1	Identify which staff positions have radios and explain the reasoning. A hierarchical chart or diagram may be used.	Identity of staff having radios along with rationale for assignment
4.1.1.1	List the message codes used for radio communications.	List of codes
4.1.1.2	Are protocols in place for internal written communication?	Y/N
4.1.1.2	Are databases created based on written reports?	Y/N
4.1.1.2	Is there an organizational chart that details the flow of communication among security staff?	Y/N
4.1.1.2	Describe the protocol in place for internal written communication.	Protocol description
4.1.1.2	Identify the types of reports that are kept.	List of report types

Section	Questions	Metric
4.1.1.2	Identify data that is recorded in a database for analysis.	Description of database
4.1.1.2	Provide the organizational chart that details the flow of communication among staff.	Organization and process chart
4.1.1.3	What percentage of employees has emergency call pagers?	%
4.1.1.3	On average, how many pagers per patron population are in use?	:
4.1.1.4	Are emergency telephones in place throughout the venue?	Y/N
4.1.1.4	If yes, what is the number of patrons per emergency phone?	:
4.1.1.4	Do the command center and other key locations have a dedicated phone line?	Y/N
4.1.1.4	Is an additional system in place for cellular network overload?	Y/N
4.1.1.4	How many calls/texts per minute from the venue is the system projected to handle? What percent larger than the average number of calls/text per minute in the venue is this number?	#, %
4.1.1.4	Is there a call load triggered access agreement with local cellular providers in place for emergencies?	Y/N
4.1.1.4	Has the reception of cellular phones and smart phones been tested at various locations in the venue?	Y/N
4.1.1.4	Is there a process in place that cellular phone and smart phone batteries are tested regularly with backups available?	Y/N
4.1.1.4	Identify the locations of emergency call phones located in the venue. A map may be included with the descriptions.	Locations of emergency phones
4.1.1.4	Indicate which locations have a dedicated phone line.	Locations of dedicated phones
4.1.1.4	Describe the system(s) in place for cellular network overload.	Description of system(s)
4.1.1.4	Detail the agreement in place with local cellular providers for emergencies.	Description of agreement

Section	Questions	Metric
4.1.2.1	Are there direct modes of communication with local law enforcement authorities?	Y/N
4.1.2.1	Are there direct modes of communication with federal law enforcement authorities?	Y/N
4.1.2.1	Does Security Management receive automatic threat alerts from a federal agency?	Y/N
4.1.2.1	Is there a representative from local and/or federal law enforcement present on-site during an event?	Y/N
4.1.2.1	Is there paid law enforcement detail at the venue during an event?	Y/N
4.1.2.1	How many law enforcement officers are on detail during an event?	#
4.1.2.1	Indicate which direct modes of communication with local law enforcement authorities are used.	Modes of communication used with local law enforcement
4.1.2.1	Indicate which direct modes of communication with federal law enforcement authorities are used.	Modes of communication with federal law enforcement
4.1.2.1	Indicate from which federal agency Security Management receives automatic threat alerts.	Federal agencies sending automated alert threats to Security Management
4.1.2.1	Indicate which type of representative from local and/or federal law enforcement is present on-site during an event.	Representatives on site
4.1.2.2	Are there direct modes of communication with emergency medical services?	Y/N
4.1.2.2	Are there direct modes of communication with the local fire department?	Y/N
4.1.2.2	Is there a medical treatment center on site?	Y/N
4.1.2.2	Is there a representative from EMS and/or fire and rescue present on-site during an event?	Y/N
4.1.2.2	Indicate which direct modes of communication with emergency medical services are used.	Modes of communication with EMS

Section	Questions	Metric
4.1.2.2	Indicate which direct modes of communication with the local fire department are used.	Modes of communication with fire department
4.1.2.2	Indicate the primary modes of communication with the medical treatment center during an emergency.	Modes of communication with emergency medical center
4.1.2.2	Indicate which representative from EMS and/or fire and rescue is present on-site during an event.	Names of on-site representatives
4.1.2.3	Have critical infrastructure sites nearby the facility been identified?	Y/N
4.1.2.3	Has a channel of communication been established with each of the sites identified?	Y/N
4.1.2.3	Is there a direct mode of contact with the utility providers for the venue?	Y/N
4.1.2.3	Does the point of contact at each site have the authority to make operational decisions during an emergency?	Y/N
4.1.2.3	How often is the point of contact information verified?	Freq.
4.1.2.3	Are test messages sent to these points of contact? What percentage of the time are these messages successfully relayed/received?	Y/N, %
4.1.2.3	Indicate which critical infrastructure sites are adjacent to the venue and the proximal distance of each.	List of sites and distances
4.1.2.3	Indicate which modes of communication with the critical infrastructure sites are used.	Communication modes used
4.1.2.3	Indicate with which utility provider(s) to the venue contact has been established and the mode of contact.	Utility providers and contact modes
4.1.2.3	Indicate the title of the point of contact for each critical infrastructure site.	Points of contact with titles
4.1.3.1	Is a public address system utilized for communication with patrons?	Y/N
4.1.3.1	How many pre-scripted messages are prepared for emergency situations? How many languages are used for these messages?	#,#

Section	Questions	Metric
4.1.3.1	Is there a procedure in place to compose an emergency message that is not pre-scripted?	Y/N
4.1.3.1	Identify the types of messages prepared for public announcements, including emergency & non-emergency messages; event related and precautionary messages.	Message types
4.1.3.1	Identify which staff position is responsible for message composition.	Staff assigned to compose messages
4.1.3.2	Are message boards used for relaying messages to patrons?	Y/N
4.1.3.2	Is the system utilized during non-emergency situations, such as entertainment?	Y/N
4.1.3.2	If a text messaging system is available is the phone number displayed on message boards?	Y/N
4.1.3.2	If a text messaging number is displayed on message boards, what is the quantity of text messages received?	#
4.1.3.2	Has the quantity of received messages increased over time and, if so, by what percentage?	Y/N, %
4.1.3.3	Are television monitors used for relaying messages to patrons?	Y/N
4.1.3.3	Are television monitors used for providing patron access to media coverage?	Y/N
4.1.3.3	Are television monitors used for non-emergency purposes?	Y/N
4.1.3.3	Are television monitors able to provide video messages to patrons during an emergency?	Y/N
4.1.3.3	How many pre-scripted video messages are prepared?	#
4.1.3.4	Is information communicated through permanent signs at the venue?	Y/N
4.1.3.4	Are temporary signs used to communicate information?	Y/N

Section	Questions	Metric
4.1.3.4	If signs are removed, what is the slow-down in corresponding behavior (e.g. moving to a different gate to enter)?	#
4.1.3.4	Indicate which information is permanently displayed and the quantity & locations of the signs.	Signage locations and displayed information
4.1.3.4	Indicate which information is temporarily displayed and the quantity & locations of the signs.	Signage locations and displayed information
4.1.3.4	If temporary signs have been removed during events, describe the crowd behavior with and without the presence of the signs.	Descriptions of crowd behavior
4.1.3.5	Is a text messaging system available to patrons for communication with security services?	Y/N
4.1.3.5	Are incidents reported through the texting system retained in a database?	Y/N
4.1.3.5	If so, how many incidents per event are reported? What is the response time for attending to incidents?	#, Time
4.1.3.5	Has an emergency message distribution list been established? What is the increase in the number of people listed there compared to last year?	Y/N ,#
4.1.3.5	Is the system utilized during non-emergency situations? How often?	Y/N
4.1.3.5	How often are test messages sent to patrons?	Freq.
4.1.3.6	Are social media used for relaying messages to patrons?	Y/N
4.1.3.6	For each platform used, how many followers does the venue have? How much has the number of followers increased since last year?	#, #
4.1.3.6	For each platform used, how frequently are updates made?	Freq.
4.2.1	Is there a security plan for computer and information systems hardware and software? How often is the plan revisited?	Y/N, Freq.
4.2.1	Are there any cyber-security software or protective measures implemented?	Y/N

Section	Questions	Metric
4.2.1	Is there a process for testing and evaluating computer security measures?	Y/N
4.2.1	Have penetration tests been performed? How often are such tests performed?	Y/N, #

Section	Questions	Metric
5.1.1	If applicable, does the venue have vehicle screening protocols in place? Do these protocols include media, staff, vendors and service providers?	Y/N, Y/N
5.1.1	How close may a vehicle park to the stadium without being screened?	#
5.1.1	Are license plate readers or other devices used to identify patrons or their vehicles in the parking lot areas?	Y/N
5.1.1	How many security personnel are patrolling the parking lot areas? How many CCTVs are monitoring these areas?	#, #
5.1.1	What is the average ratio of patrol staff to vehicles?	:
5.1.1	Are patrols randomized?	Y/N
5.1.1	Is behavioral assessment used? If so, how many law enforcement officials with behavioral assessment training are utilized on event days?	Y/N ,#
5.1.1	How many plain clothes law enforcement officials are utilized on event day?	#
5.1.1	If applicable, are parking infrastructures protected by physical security measures?	Y/N
5.1.1	How many clear garbage cans with clear liners (contents visible) are in place? How many opaque garbage cans (contents not visible) are in place?	Y/N, Y/N
5.1.2	Are structures in place to ensure safe and speedy movement to and from critical transportation systems around the venue?	Y/N
5.1.2	How many CCTVs are in place monitoring the area between transportation systems and the venue?	#
5.1.3	Is there an initial screening for vendor deliveries? How far away from the venue?	Y/N ,#
5.1.3	At this checkpoint, is the delivery driver information checked with information provided by the vendor?	Y/N

Section	Questions	Metric
5.1.3	Do service providers have to schedule a time to conduct service repairs?	Y/N
5.1.3	Is trash collection conducted outside of event operational times?	Y/N
5.1.3	What screening techniques are used when conducting patron vehicle screening?	Technique Description
5.1.3	What screening techniques are used when conducting employee vehicle screening?	Technique Description
5.1.4	How frequently do airplane takeoffs or approaches at nearby airports coincide with time of events? How close do airplanes come to the venue?	Freq. ,#
5.2.1	Are queue lengths measured or estimated?	Y/N
5.2.1	What size bags are allowed inside the venue?	#
5.2.1	Are procedures in place to encourage early arrival or arrival at gates with less traffic? Are measures of the success of these procedures in place?	Y/N, Y/N
5.2.1	Is there an initial layer of screening before patrons enter the queue?	Y/N
5.2.1	Are models use to estimate the impact of changes in the patron screening process?	Y/N
5.2.1	What are goals related to queue length and are they being met?	Comparison of goals to standards, and of performance to goals.
5.2.1	What method(s) of screening is employed at patron entry points in comparable venues?	Comparison to similar stadiums
5.2.2	Are the contents of the vehicle inspected to ensure they correspond to the delivery manifest? If this inspection is random, what percentages of vehicles and/or packages are inspected?	Y/N ,%
5.2.2	Is the undercarriage of the delivery vehicle inspected?	Y/N
5.2.2	Are K-9 units deployed to screen the vehicle for explosives?	Y/N

Section	Questions	Metric
5.2.2	Are vehicles swiped to detect explosive materials?	Y/N
5.2.3	Are media inspected before entry?	Y/N
5.2.3	Are media vehicles inspected before entry?	Y/N
5.2.4	How many cameras are used in the middle zone of the venue?	#
5.2.4	How frequently is camera performance monitored?	Freq.
5.2.4	Are camera positions changed from time to time? If so, how often?	Y/N, Freq.
5.2.4	Are any cameras equipped with intelligent analytics to detect potential threats?	Y/N
5.3.1	How many cameras are utilized in the inner zone? Do they have zoom capability?	#, Y/N
5.3.1	How often are cameras in the inner zone checked?	Freq.
5.3.1	Are cameras in the inner zone moved from time to time to avoid a stagnant pattern of placement?	Y/N
5.3.1	What percentage of the inner zone can be seen by camera?	%
5.3.2	How frequently are areas in the inner zone swept for suspicious materials?	Freq.
5.3.2	Are bomb-sniffing K-9 units involved in these sweeps?	Y/N
5.3.4	Are there alarm systems in place to recognize unapproved entry to off-limits areas?	Y/N
5.3.4	Are protocols in place to address alarms from access systems?	Y/N
5.3.4	Are statistics kept on the number of unauthorized attempts to enter secure areas?	Y/N
5.3.4	Is the ability to enter secure areas with expired or missing credentials tested? What percentage of the time can secure areas be accessed successfully with such credentials?	Y/N, %

Section	Questions	Metric
5.3.4	Is there a plan in place clearly delimiting different areas of the stadium, their access points, and the card level access required to enter them?	Y/N
5.3.4	Are there established food security policies in place?	Y/N
5.3.4	Are there established mail security policies in place?	Y/N
5.4.1	How many incident response plans has the venue developed?	#
5.4.1	Do these response plans cover the threats identified as having the greatest risk as identified in the risk assessment?	Y/N
5.4.1	How often are exercises conducted on implementing the incident response plans?	Freq.
5.4.1	Are response plans changed based on the results of exercises?	Y/N
5.4.1	Has the venue developed a mass fatality plan?	Y/N
5.4.1	Has the venue developed a mass decontamination plan?	Y/N
5.4.1	Describe the resources available on-site to support implementation of the mass fatality plan?	Resource Description
5.4.1	Describe the resources on-site to support the mass decontamination plan?	Resource Description
5.4.2	Are evacuation and shelter-in-place plans in place?	Y/N
5.4.2	What percentage of fans have a basic knowledge of stadium evacuation procedures?	%
5.4.2	How long would an evacuation of a capacity crowd take?	#
5.4.2	How long would a shelter-in-place of a capacity crowd take?	#
5.4.2	How often are employees trained on evacuation procedures?	Freq.
5.4.2	How often are evacuation drills conducted?	Freq.

Section	Questions	Metric
5.4.2	Are staff positioned within the stadium to assist with fan movement during the event?	Y/N
5.4.2	How many times are secret shoppers given directions by stadium employees on their way to their seats?	#
5.4.2	On average, how many minutes after the end of an event is the stadium cleared?	#
5.4.2	Are exits closed (or other obstructions introduced) to study this impact on stadium clearance time?	Y/N
5.4.2	Are there assurances in place that emergency vehicles and personnel can reach the stadium during an evacuation?	Y/N
5.4.2	Is there a procedure in place for determining if an evacuation is necessary?	Y/N
5.4.2	Are egress routes monitored for potential security risks?	Y/N
5.4.2	Does the stadium coordinate with local authorities to assure quick dispersal of stadium patrons from the area around the stadium either during an evacuation or at the end of an event?	Y/N
5.4.2	Are evacuation routes identified?	Y/N
5.4.2	What are the roadway capacities of the evacuation routes from the stadium?	#
5.4.2	Does the venue implement traffic management plans pre and post-event?	Y/N
5.4.2	Are evacuation procedures communicated to fans during or before an event?	Y/N
5.4.2	How many minutes of air-time are given on the message boards to evacuation procedures? How many minutes before the start of an event are these procedures last mentioned?	#,#
5.4.2	Describe the resources available on-site to support implementation of the evacuation plan.	Resource Description
5.4.3	Are plans in place for handling elevated security events?	Y/N

Section	Questions	Metric
5.4.3	How often are plans reviewed with agencies with added responsibility for special events?	Freq.
5.4.3	Are security procedures documented should outside entities need to take control?	Y/N
5.4.3	Is speed of response tested during tabletop exercises (or other venue incident response preparedness drills)?	Y/N
5.4.3	Is venue management consulted with respect to incident management planning?	Y/N
5.4.3	What additional agencies are involved in plans for special events?	List of agencies

Section	Questions	Metric
6.Intro	Have you outlined staff types or security team roles so as to better plan training and exercises?	Y/N
6.Intro	Have you considered differences in training standards between in-house and contracted staff?	Y/N
6.Intro	Have you implemented patron training programs to better prepare them for action during emergencies?	Y/N
6.1.1	Do you have a program in place to assure certification?	Y/N
6.1.1	Do you know the state requirements for guards?	Y/N
6.1.1	Has your contractor satisfied state requirements for guards?	Y/N
6.1.1	Does your contract specify your right to make quality assurance checks on services provided?	Y/N
6.1.2	Are your security guards familiar with the details of your venue?	Y/N
6.1.2	Do you have short re-fresher training modules available to quiz security staff? If so, how often do you run refresher training?	Y/N , Freq.
6.1.3	Does your security plan integrate training as a part of quality assurance?	Y/N
6.1.3	Is your security director aware of federal agency resources available to the venue for the purposes of training?	Y/N
6.1.3	Are the results of training recorded and kept as part of employee files?	Y/N
6.1.3	Are employees rewarded for performance in spotting potential security breaches? If so, what percentage of employees have been so rewarded?	Y/N , %
6.1.3	How long does it take employees to find a hidden fake bomb? Is the length of time to find such a bomb lower than it was a year ago?	#, Y/N
6.1.3	Is local law enforcement involved in tabletop exercises? If so, in what percentage of such exercises?	Y/N , %

Section	Questions	Metric
6.1.4	Does your annual budget contain a line for training?	Y/N
6.1.4	What percentage of your employees are involved in the exercises that use the largest number of employees?	%
6.1.4	What percentage of exercises involve at least 30% of employees?	%
6.1.4	Does your plan have built-in metrics to assess the effectiveness of your training?	Y/N
6.1.4	Do you perform post-event debriefings ("hot washes") with metrics for learning and accountability?	Y/N
6.1.4	How are After Action Reports (AARs) utilized?	Described use of AARs
6.1.5	Do you attempt to educate patrons concerning evacuation procedures? Screening procedures?	Y/N, Y/N
6.1.5	Do you have a way of testing the effectiveness of your patron education techniques? If so, what is the percentage of patrons that retain the information?	Y/N , %
6.1.5	On what other topics besides evacuation and screening do you try to educate patrons?	Topics for patron education
6.1.5	Which technologies (e.g. PA system, Videos, Signage, Social Media, etc.) are most effective for educating patrons for which purposes?	Discussion of the educational effectiveness of technologies
6.2	Do you have a quality assurance plan in place?	Y/N
6.2	What percentage of the staff is briefed on the quality assurance plan?	%
6.2	Is relevant staff quizzed on their knowledge of the quality assurance plan?	Y/N
6.2	If so, what percent of quiz questions do they answer correctly?	%
6.2.1	Do you perform red teaming at your facility?	Y/N

Section	Questions	Metric
6.2.1	Do you have protocols in place that work to retrain and correct behavior at the front line?	Y/N
6.2.1	Do you have regularly scheduled and varied exercises in place for assessing quality of in-house search?	Y/N
6.2.2	Do you have a clear and readily available organizational chart?	Y/N
6.2.2	Does this chart specify the relationship between contract staff and venue operators?	Y/N
6.2.2	Is there a procedure in place for supervisors to audit front-line staff? Is there a procedure for management to audit supervisors?	Y/N
6.2.2	Have you paired veteran staff and younger staff in pseudo apprentice-style relationships?	Y/N